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ABSTRACT 
During a statewide disaster in Vermont, one of the most important actions 
Vermont Emergency Management should take during the response phase is to 
maintain awareness of the situation and provide coordinated logistical support.  If 
the State does not understand what is occurring, or is not able to perform 
resource coordination in support of response efforts across the State, then local 
and state responses are not coordinated, and actionable federal requests for 
assistance cannot be articulated.  Forty-five states have county emergency 
management structures between municipal and state structures, which 
regionalize emergency management within those states.  Of the five states 
without county emergency management structures, Rhode Island has 39 
municipalities, Connecticut and Massachusetts have established regional 
emergency management structures that do not align with counties, New 
Hampshire has 234 municipalities linked to the state emergency management 
center, and the State of Vermont has 251 municipal Emergency Management 
Directors who are linked directly to a single state Emergency Operations Center.  
This paper examines emergency management span of control nationally, surveys 
emergency management directors in four New England states, and proposes a 
regional construct for emergency management in Vermont, to enable effective 
emergency management during the next man-made or natural disaster. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The hard-working and capable members of Vermont Emergency 
Management inherited an organizational structure which has been, and which will 
continue to be, effective for events the size and scale of which Vermont has 
experienced within the past several decades.  Vermont does not have county or 
regional Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs).  Therefore, during an 
emergency, Vermont’s 251 municipalities send both situation assessments and 
requests for resources directly to the state’s single EOC. The current 
organizational structure may not be adequate to address a major or catastrophic 
disaster.  The term “major or catastrophic” is used in Vermont’s Emergency 
Operations Plans as a trigger between different emergency management 
structures and processes, and it is used synonymously here.  Examples of major 
or catastrophic disasters which occurred in Vermont prior to the establishment of 
Vermont Emergency Management include the flu epidemic of 1918, flooding in 
1927, and the 1938 Hurricane.  More recently, there are lessons from Hurricane 
Katrina related to the failure of emergency management at the local and state 
levels to maintain situational awareness in order to be able to form actionable 
requests for assistance.  The lesson for Vermont is not about hurricanes or 
levees, it is a demonstration of the results produced when as state’s emergency 
management functions are overwhelmed. 
In 45 states, there are county EOCs that regionalize emergency 
management functions between the respective state EOCs and municipal EOCs.  
The five states without county EOCs are all in New England.  Of these five 
states, Connecticut and Massachusetts have established regional EOCs 
organizationally among the state EOC and municipal EOCs.  Rhode Island has 
39 municipalities, all linked directly to the single state EOC.  The two remaining 
states, Vermont and New Hampshire, each have over 200 municipalities linked to 
a single state EOC.   
 xvi
The central question of this thesis is whether the organizational structure 
of emergency management in Vermont can be optimized to enable more 
effective emergency management.  In order to assemble relevant background 
facts and information to permit analysis of existing structures and possible 
futures, span of control literature is reviewed, both generally and as it specifically 
applies to emergency management structures.  Bear in mind that the literal 
meaning of the phrase “span of control” is misnomer when applied to emergency 
management functions, in the sense that emergency management organizations 
support response and recovery efforts of municipal jurisdictions.  Emergency 
management organizations do not command or control response or recovery 
activities.  The term “span of control” therefore is used within this thesis with the 
same meaning that it is used commonly when emergency management 
structures are discussed, however inviting it might be to coin in this thesis an as-
yet unseen phrase such as “span of coordination”, “span of support” or “span of 
awareness” with respect to the number of county and/or municipal organizations 
which connect to a state emergency operations center.  Further, the following are 
also reviewed: emergency management theory; emergency management 
structures in the five states without county EOCs; the results of a survey of local 
Emergency Management Directors (EMDs) in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, and Vermont which asked about the training and experience of 
EMDs, whether EMDs have other public safety duties, and the status of 
municipal emergency management facilities;  and Vermont’s existing emergency 
management structures, including the plan to establish Regional Coordination 
Centers (RCCs).  RCCs have not yet been implemented, but the intent 
articulated in the Vermont State Emergency Operations Plan is to stand up RCCs 
when the state EOC is overwhelmed, enabling the regionalization of emergency 
management functions (most importantly logistical coordination support during 
the response phase).   
 
 xvii
The analysis begins by assessing the role, purpose and impact of 
strategic leadership, specifically with an eye towards developing a strategic goal 
of organizational structures which optimize desired emergency management 
processes in Vermont.  The principles of emergency management are 
summarized, which when interwoven with statutory and fiscal restraints, shape 
the realm of possible futures with respect to emergency management 
organizational structures.  The author then considers the possible visions for an 
organizational structure in Vermont that best enables the principles of emergency 
management, including maintaining the status quo, and concludes that the State 
of Vermont is best served by standing up four regional EOCs aligned with 
existing Public Safety Districts (PSDs).  The regional EOCs would be the first 
contact for coordination of state resources whenever local resources are 
exceeded.  The author proposes the regional EOCs be staffed with full-time 
dedicated emergency management personnel, who become familiar with their 
jurisdiction, and who represent Vermont Emergency Management through all 
four phases of emergencies (mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery), 
not just the response phase.  Currently, there are regional emergency 
management structures in Vermont that perform functions during the mitigation, 
preparedness and recovery phases of an emergency.  In addition to considering 
funding sources for new structures, the author considers the realignment of 
existing resources as may be required for the collective good. 
State and local governments in Vermont have made positive changes and 
have dedicated significant resources to increasing emergency management 
capabilities in Vermont.  For example, revisions to Vermont statutes in 2005 gave 
the Governor the authority to divide the state into PSDs, with emergency 
management authorities.  Similarly, in 2005, the Governor signed an Executive 
Order mandating the adoption of the National Incident Management System by 
all municipal and state first responder agencies. This thesis is an opportunity to 
take a fresh and independent look at the measures introduced and whether there 
are any improvements that could be made. This thesis recommends 
 xviii
organizational structures that could further improve the effectiveness and 
resilience of the emergency management systems at local and state levels 
designed to maintain the security and continuity of emergency management 
functions during Vermont’s next major or catastrophic disaster. 
 xix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
There are many people to thank for their guidance and encouragement 
during this challenging yet rewarding process.  Participation in this program 
would not have been possible without unwavering support from Major General 
Michael D. Dubie, Adjutant General of the State of Vermont.  His dedication to 
preparing the Vermont National Guard for the spectrum of potential domestic 
operates permeates its 4,000 members.  At the Center for Homeland Defense 
and Security, Naval Postgraduate School, I have found Richard Bergin, Chris 
Bellavita, and Greta Marlatt each to be the rarest combination of subject matter 
expertise, teaching skills, and enthusiasm.  My sincere thanks for the 
contributions of the members of Vermont Emergency Management; including 
Director Barbara Farr, Deputy Director for Operations and Logistics Peter Coffey, 
and Deputy Director for Preparedness and Planning Ross Nagy.  I owe a sincere 
debt of gratitude to my classmates, both for helping to educate me and for 
serving as sounding boards for my thesis as I ventured outside my subject matter 
expertise into theirs, and also for their willingness to use logic and critical thinking 
to address the spectrum of critical, albeit sometimes emotionally-charged, 
homeland security issues.  None of my many time-consuming quests are ever 
possible without the constant unshakeable foundation of support from my wife 
Christina.  To my children, I hope this thesis will serve as an example that one 
can have the honor of engaging dedicated Americans and dreaming big ideas of 
change, and that it is possible to be part of the dialectic of making our state and 
nation better.  I have received a true gift of knowledge and experience from the 
Center for Homeland Defense and Security, and it is my strongest intention to 
repay as much as my abilities permit, through a potentially impactful thesis, the 
debt I have resulting from the nation’s investment in me. 
       Ludwig J. Schumacher 
 xx
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is best to do things systematically…since we are only human, and 
disorder is our worst enemy.1 
Hesiod 
Uncertainty is the only certainty there is.2 
 John Allen Paulos 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In the tension between uncertainty and order, emergency management 
organizations work to reduce chaos during the response phase of a disaster.  
The speed at which disaster assessment and resource coordination occurs, and 
even the ability of emergency management organizations to continue functioning 
during catastrophic emergencies, are directly tied to the design of the emergency 
management organizations themselves.  Emergency management organizations 
exist at municipal and often county levels of government, as well as state and 
federal levels of government.  Whether the organizations and their respective 
connections are optimized or misprioritized determines capabilities such as 
resiliency, redundancy, and responsiveness.  The span of control between levels 
of emergency management organizations is the number of linkages between 
Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) at different levels of government.  For 
example, if a State EOC is linked to 23 county EOCs, then the span of control is 
1 to 23.  If a county EOC is linked to 17 municipalities within its jurisdiction, then 
the span of control for the county EOC is 1 to 17.  Policymakers can set a 
strategic vision for a robust, resilient and responsive emergency management 
structure by periodically evaluating the principles of emergency management in 
the light of known constraints. 
Emergency management is the protection of population and property from 
the destructive forces of natural and man-made disasters through a 
comprehensive program of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.3  
                                            
1 Charles E. Wilbour, trans., 8th c. B.C., Works and Days, 471. 
2 John Allen Paulos, Professor of mathematics at Temple University, 
http://www.math.temple.edu/~paulos/ (accessed August 28, 2008). 
3 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 2004. 
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Local and state governments have responsibilities for the performance of 
emergency management functions.  During the response phase of an 
emergency, emergency management organizations locate in their respective 
EOCs to perform assessment and resource coordination functions.  In addition to 
municipal and state emergency management structures across the nation, 45 of 
the 50 states also have county emergency management organizations that link 
state EOCs, and municipal EOCs within a county.4  County emergency 
management agencies have been praised for their capabilities and 
accomplishments.5  Two of the five states without county EOCs,6 Connecticut 
                                            
4 There are significant emergency management capabilities at the county level: 62 percent of 
U.S. counties have a mobile command unit, two-thirds of counties have conducted an emergency 
management training exercise within the last year, and 78 percent of counties nationally have 
established emergency management units separate from the police/sheriff and fire departments. 
The five states that do not have county emergency management agencies did not participate in 
this survey. W. Clarke, Emergency Management in County Government: A National Survey 
(Washington, D.C.: National Association of Counties, 2006), v-1.  
5 America’s 3,066 counties vary in geographic shape, size, population and in the services 
they provide, but the one thing that unites them is that they are responsible for emergency 
management planning, and very often are the ‘first responders’ to disasters such as those on 
September 11. Whether it is a fire, flood or horrific crash, counties across the nation are prepared 
to respond to virtually any emergency situation. National Association of Counties, Counties 
Secure America, A Survey of Emergency Preparedness of the Nation’s Counties, October 2001, 
4. 
6 In the U.S., the absence of county-level EOCs is a specifically New England phenomenon. 
Of the six New England states, only Maine has county-level EOCs. Maine’s 16 County EOCs 
report directly to the State EOC, with each County EOC having from 12 to 70 towns that report to 
them. Dale D. Rowley, PE, CEM-ME, CEM, Director Waldo County Emergency Management 
Agency, Personal correspondence, August 14, 2008. The five other New England states do not 
have county-level EOCs, and are also the only states in the nation without county-level EOCs. 
Soil, climate, and space are cited as reasons for regional preferences for facilitating local control 
by city and town governments and minimizing the intervention of geographically broader 
governmental structures into municipal affairs: Compared to the South, the settled area in New 
England was “much less spacious, the climate harsher, and people lived nearer each other. In 
some localities, in fact, local laws required that no resident be more than a half mile, or a mile, 
from the center of the village. As a consequence, villages, towns and later cities emerged as 
more important units of government than counties. The New England states did create 
counties…But many of the functions performed by counties in the southern region were assumed 
by city and town governments in the north.” National Association of Counties, History of 
Government, 
http://www.naco.org/Content/NavigationMenu/About_Counties/History_of_County_Government/D
efault983.htm (accessed August 15, 2008). See also Frank A. Updyke, County Government in 
New England, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 47, County 
Government, May 1913, 26: “While in the Southern states the county soon came to assume large 
powers in general administration, in the New England states the county developed little beyond 
the sphere of judicial administration. The local autonomy of the town hindered the development of 
the powers of the more artificial district of the county.” 
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and Massachusetts, have established regional EOCs that perform emergency 
management functions between municipal EOCs and the respective state EOC.  
With respect to the three states in the nation without county EOCs or regional 
EOCs, Rhode Island has 39 municipal governments with EOCs linked directly to 
the Rhode Island State EOC, while Vermont and New Hampshire each have over 
200 municipal governments which, for the purposes of emergency management 
functions, under most circumstances are directly linked to a single state EOC. 
With roots back to 1949 under civil defense organizational constructs, 
Vermont Emergency Management in its current form was established in 1989. 
The hard-working members of Vermont Emergency Management have inherited 
an organizational structure which has been, and which will continue to be, very 
effective for the spectrum of emergencies which have occurred in Vermont in 
recent memory.   Nevertheless, this organizational structure has not been tested 
in a major or catastrophic event,7 such as the 1918 pandemic flu, flooding in 
1927, or the 1938 New England hurricane that devastated Vermont.  The limits 
and impacts of having too wide a span of control are discussed later in this 
thesis.  A disaster in Vermont affecting all municipalities would result in 
Vermont’s single State EOC attempting to communicate and coordinate directly 
with 251 municipalities.  To address this span of control issue, the current State 
of Vermont Emergency Operations Plan provides that four Regional Coordination 
Centers (RCCs) will regionalize emergency management functions in the event 
of a major or catastrophic disaster.  There are advantages and significant 
disadvantages to this organizational structure.  Because the RCC construct has 
not yet been implemented, this is an opportune time for a comprehensive 
analysis of the organizational possibilities for emergency management in 
Vermont. 
                                            
7 The phrase “major or catastrophic event” is used in Vermont’s Emergency Operations Plan 
as a trigger for both required organizational structures and processes, and the term is used with 
identical meaning in this thesis. See, e.g., Annex VII, Vermont Emergency Management Field 
Operations Standard Operating Procedure, (April 30, 2005), 3: “For major or catastrophic events, 
the State Rapid Assessment and Assistance Team will deploy to the impacted Public Safety 
District.”  
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This thesis explores the possibilities for regionalizing emergency 
management structures and processes within Vermont, along with an articulated 
process for change which identifies foundational principles and integrates 
applicable constraints, including funding.  While the thesis considers the State of 
Vermont, it may be relevant to emergency management in other jurisdictions.  It 
is hoped that policymakers may better appreciate the implications of the 
organizational transformation of emergency management structures, and that 
local, regional, and state stakeholders may be motivated to collective efforts. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How does Vermont optimize emergency management structures and 
processes that function effectively during a disaster impacting most or all of the 
state? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
With some variation, we all have a mental picture of how emergency 
managers heroically respond to a disaster, accomplishing a number of 
communication and resource coordination tasks simultaneously.  The scene is a 
flurry of activity, with varyingly successful and sometimes unsuccessful efforts.  
Time-critical decisions are made with assumptions serving as temporary 
placeholders for facts that cannot be known, or perhaps even as placeholders for 
facts that can be known, and there may be some delay in addressing lower 
priority issues.  Immediately after a disaster, we see structures and processes 
which were built through many hours of hard work during periods of relative calm 
being tested as they enable rapid assessment and resource coordination.  The 
image is central to the American psyche; at least one author has argued that 
emergency management is regarded as the quintessential public service at all 
levels of government by its citizens.8   
                                            
8 Claire B. Rubin, “Emergency Management: The American Experience, 1900-2005,” Slide 
15. 
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Without question, how emergency management organizations respond will 
be the difference in lives saved and lives lost.  Operational failures resulting in 
inappropriate or incomplete organizational responses to unexpected or 
demanding contingencies are ever more likely to be critically disabling.9  
Organizational challenges are not concerned with the type of event.  The 
likelihood of a specific major or catastrophic disaster may be low, but the 
likelihood of any major or catastrophic disaster has a significantly greater 
probability.  Further, the considerable event-specific planning conducted to date 
(e.g. pandemic influenza, the flood of 1927, a repeat of the 1938 east coast 
hurricane, a radiological event at Vermont’s nuclear power plant, a WMD event, 
or numerous other predicted major or catastrophic disasters) is undermined if 
there is a single Achilles’ heel for any of those scenarios.10  
The Hurricane Katrina response reflects the failure of emergency 
management structures and processes at local and state levels.  The published 
lessons learned provide a litany of specific failings, including communications, 
                                            
9 Gregory A. Bigley, “The Incident Command System: High-reliability Organizing for Complex 
and Volatile Task Environments,” Academy of Management Journal 44 no. 6 (2001): 1281. 
10 Not only is it an Achilles’ heel for each scenario, but it is an Achilles’ heel for all 
emergency management target capabilities for each scenario. An effective SEOC directly enables 
the Emergency Operations Center Management capability on DHS’s Target Capability List (TCL). 
Further, during a large scale event, an effective SEOC organizational structure enables success 
of twenty (20) capabilities on DHS’s TCL. The absence of an effective span of control for the 
SEOC would result in the failure of effective response for any of the following (if major or 
catastrophic): Onsite Incident Management, Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution, 
Volunteer Management, Responder Safety and Health, Public Safety and Security Response, 
Animal Health Emergency Support, Environmental Health and Vector Control, Explosive Device 
Response Operations, Firefighting Operations/Support, WMD/Hazardous Materials Response 
and Decontamination, Citizen Protection: Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection, Isolation and 
Quarantine, Urban Search & Rescue, Emergency Public Information and Warning, Triage and 
Pre-Hospital Treatment, Medical Surge, Medical Supplies Management and Distribution, Mass 
Prophylaxis, Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and Related Services), or Fatality Management. 
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situational assessment and awareness, and many others,11 all subcomponents 
of the larger umbrella of emergency management.  In the absence of effective 
emergency management at local and state levels, neither local governments nor 
the State of Louisiana were able to form actionable requests for assistance.  The 
author participated in conference calls where the question “What do you need?” 
was answered with “Send everything you’ve got!” while watching events unfold 
seemingly in slow motion on days two, three and four following hurricane 
landfall.12  Some describe this as a failure of government at the local and state 
levels; regardless, lead elected officials are held responsible for the performance 
of their respective emergency management organizations.  Even when 
emergency management coordinates an effective response to a disaster, there 
are often hard lessons learned that the system was not nearly as robust, capable 
or resilient as it had appeared on paper in the calm of day or during exercises.13 
Unlike many other fields where the passage of time yields more capability 
due to some combination of progress in the related body of knowledge, or 
significant technology advances, emergency management functions are facing 
increasingly severe challenges. Despite progress in emergency management 
                                            
11 For example, the U.S. House of Representatives’ select bipartisan committee to 
investigate Hurricane Katrina identified how the “near total failure of regional communications 
degraded situational awareness and exacerbated problems with agency coordination, command 
and control, logistics, and search and rescue operations.” The Select Bipartisan Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative, 165. 
According to the Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned report released by the White House, “[t]he 
final structural flaw in our current system for national preparedness is the weakness of our 
regional planning and coordination structures.” The White House, The Federal Response to 
Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, 53. As will be described later, planning is central to 
emergency management functions during the preparedness phase. Coordination structures 
appears to be used here as a synonym for emergency management structures. 
12 National Guard Bureau all-states teleconferences during Hurricane Katrina response. The 
National Guard had at that time over 450,000 members and associated equipment. The National 
Guard response to Hurricane Katrina was over 50,000 personnel. 
13 See, e.g., comments of Joseph F. Bruno, Commissioner of New York City's Office of 
Emergency Management: “Clearly, one of the biggest things that we did after 9/11 was the 
implementation of the city-wide incident management system. No question that when 9/11 hit, 
and I think the perception was that management of that event needed to be stronger.” A. Dunn, 
“The Big Seven: Seven Questions for the Country's Top Emergency Managers,” Disaster-
Resource.Com, 2006. http://www.disaster-resource.com/articles/06p_032.shtml (accessed 
October 1, 2007). See also “Consequence Reduction: Response and Recovery,” Volpe Journal 
2003, 24. (“Redundancy must be built into institutions and physical systems.”) 
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theory and improvements in emergency management structures, processes, and 
technologies, disasters have increased both in human and economic costs.14  
Disasters are a growth business.  Associated losses are large, and growing, with 
no end in sight.15 While increases in emergency management capability may be 
linear, increases in services required to assist impacted populations appear 
almost exponential.  Our grandparents did not expect to have running water and 
electricity at all times, and they kept a stock of wood to heat the home, with at 
least a few weeks of preserves in the basement.  The present generation tends 
to view loss of power or running water as a crisis, and has limited ability to 
provide for itself for more than a few days.  The next generation may be unable 
to contemplate filling a tub with water to flush the toilet, or take preparedness 
actions that our grandparents considered elementary.  In essence, we are raising 
a generation of victims: a high-maintenance public with raised expectations for 
response.16  Finally, as the pace of change increases in nearly every component 
of society, the resulting increase in complexity directly impacts the 
responsiveness of emergency management.  With the explosion of available data 
from the internet, news feeds, internal data sources, and sensors, it has become 
increasingly difficult to process arriving data and extract actionable information.   
 
 
                                            
14 Recent trends reflect not only a wide variety of disasters, notable both for their increasing 
cost and impact on human and animal populations of the planet, but also “the clear emergence of 
disasters as billion dollar events, with substantial economic and political impacts.” Walter G. 
Green, III, The Future of Disasters: Interesting Trends for Interesting Times, Paper prepared for 
Worldfuture 2003, 21st Century Opportunities and Challenges, San Francisco, CA, July 18, 2003. 
15 B. W. Blanchard, Background "Think Piece" for the Emergency Management Roundtable 
meeting, EMI, March 5-6, 2007 on What is Emergency Management, and What are the Principles 
of Emergency Management (Emmitsburg, MD: U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2007a), 22. 
16 See, e.g., comments of Michael Murphy, MMRS Director Emergency Medical Services 
Authority Oklahoma City OK: “Prior to Katrina, we didn’t have massive evacuations with people 
sitting there helpless…As populations get moved, we have created expectations that people can 
sit back and wait to get cared for, then be reimbursed for their trouble…Our practice is building 
the expectation that no matter what the malady, someone else is going to take care of it, when a 
little foresight could have prevented it.” Personal correspondence, September 25, 2008. See also 
comments of Sherri Hagerhjelm, RN, who assisted evacuees from Hurricane Gustav, at 
http://www.ksla.com/Global/story.asp?S=8989550.make (accessed September 23, 2008). 
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Unless data is transformed into information, overload compromises the ability of 
decision makers to make timely and effective decisions with respect to resource 
coordination efforts. 
Some argue that we have improperly focused on planning for specific 
hazards, at the expense of properly addressing vulnerabilities.17  Structural 
deficiencies in emergency management organizations are not a man-made or 
natural disaster, but nonetheless make us more vulnerable to large-scale events, 
regardless of the cause or type.18  A vulnerability analysis, which should include 
emergency management as one of the several topics beyond the disasters 
themselves, could help identify key components of that vulnerability, identify 
issues that create high-impact weaknesses, and compare the relative costs and 
benefits of remedial measures.19  The vulnerability analysis may result in some 
less-probable events being moved up on the hazard list due to the fact that the 
most common events are usually those for which the jurisdiction is most 
prepared.20   
                                            
17 Steven Bender points out that “it is the vulnerability, stupid!” Comment made during the 
International Emergency Management Session of the FEMA Higher Education Conference on 
June 8, 2004. Similarly, Wisner et al., state that “too much emphasis in doing something about 
disasters is put on the natural hazards themselves.” P. Blaikie, T. Cannon, I. Davis and B. 
Wisner, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Disasters (Routledge: London, 
1994), 4. 
18 McEntire discusses the resulting inability to respond effectively to a disaster in Principles 
of Emergency Management: Independent Study (Emmitsburg, MD: Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, Emergency Management Institute, 2006), 
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dhs/nps37-040908-
01.pdf&code=14d5f0742cdce84aafe6d2d1d6023d08 (accessed January 2, 2008), 16. 
19 CNA Corporation, Medical Surge Capacity and Capability: A Management System for 
Integrating Medical and Health Resources during Large-Scale Emergencies, August 2004, 
http://www.cna.org/documents/mscc_aug2004.pdf (accessed September 12, 2008). 
20 Standing Together: An Emergency Planning Guide for America's Communities. Oakbrook 
Terrace, IL: Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, 2005, 
http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/FE29E7D3-22AA-4DEB-94B2-
5E8D507F92D1/0/planning_guide.pdf (accessed January 5, 2008), 19. 
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In summary, effective emergency management must establish consistent 
and cohesive coordination between the local, state and federal responses.21  The 
lesson of Hurricane Katrina for Vermont is not about hurricanes or levees.  It is 
that major or catastrophic disasters occur, and the failure of continuity of 
government may follow from the absence of structures and processes that allow 
local and state emergency management bodies to have situational awareness, 
perform resource coordination functions, or to formulate actionable requests for 
assistance.  To paraphrase the Department of Defense’s Joint Vision 2010:  Our 
challenge in this new century is a difficult one.  Although we must have plans for 
the known, our challenge is really to prepare for the unknown and the uncertain.  
That may seem an impossible task, but it is not. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis collects and synthesizes information with respect to existing 
emergency management structures, then proposes a strategic vision for 
optimizing emergency management within existing constraints.  The gap 
between the two represents an opportunity for change.  The author did not 
approach the subject matter with an organizational theory of emergency 
management to prove or disprove.  The inception of the thesis was the author’s 
general sense that a span of control of 1 to 251 was unmanageable.  If one 
walked into a room and asked 7 people for their lunch orders and they all yelled 
their requests at the same time, one could come close to resourcing the 
requests.  But if 251 people simultaneously yelled their lunch orders, meeting any 
of the requests would be difficult or impossible.   The author was eager to learn 
                                            
21 “State and local governments must be able to successfully manage small and medium 
sized disasters on their own, and they must be able to function effectively as part of an 
intergovernmental team when an event warrants a presidential disaster declaration and federal 
intervention.” Philip A. Odeen, et al., Review of Actions Taken to Strengthen the Nation's 
Emergency Management System (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Public Administration, 
1994), http://www.napawash.org/Pubs/FEMA-3-1994.pdf (accessed November 12, 2007), xi. For 
a good discussion of the position that disasters are not only local, but also regional challenges 
requiring regional solutions, see: Regional Emergency Preparedness Compacts: Safeguarding 
the Nation’s Communities prepared by William R. Dodge with the assistance of Doug Henton and 
Chi Nguyen, Members of the Alliance for Regional Stewardship National Academy of Public 
Administration National Association of Regional Councils in March 2002.  
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how existing or possible structures or processes would enable a state EOC to 
support 150, 200, or 250 municipalities simultaneously seeking assistance.  
Further, the author wanted to learn more about how wider spans of control 
impact the degree to which one is able to manage, in a high-tempo environment 
where opportunity for failure is high, the impacts of failure are high, and accuracy 
is essential.   
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II. SPAN OF CONTROL AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
A. SPAN OF CONTROL 
Span of control is a dimension of organizational structure measured by the 
number of subordinate personnel or organizations that report directly to a given 
manager.22 Organizational researchers have traditionally recommended that 
managers have no more than seven or eight people reporting directly to them.23  
Rather than settling on a fixed number of subordinates, many studies assert that 
the actual management ratio number varies based on factors including industry, 
                                            
22 The British army general Sir Ian Hamilton is credited with popularizing the concept of span 
of control in his 1922 book, The Soul and Body of an Army. He argued management ratios should 
be no more than three at the top of an organization and six for line staff. Refining Hamilton’s 
ideas, V.A. Graicunas published an article in the Bulletin of the International Management 
Institute in 1933, questioning what was then seen as a lack of theoretical basis for limiting span of 
control. Graicunas asserted that in fact the theoretical evidence was overwhelming, citing 
research on limited attention spans, which suggested that people could mentally process no more 
than six digits at a time. 
23 Lyndall F. Urwick, in his 1956 article, "The Manager's Span of Control" published in the 
Harvard Business Review, discussed pressures in the business environment that favored 
increasing management ratios. These include the general tendency of people to want to report 
directly to the manager, whoever that might be; a manager's own inclination to build his or her 
organization; the desire to reduce the costs of management overhead; the positive results gained 
with a shorter more horizontal organizational structure, such as streamlined decision-making 
processes and faster response times; and the desire to flatten the organization and drive 
authority and responsibility downward. Urwick argued, however, that the advantages of more 
horizontal organizations have to be weighed against the costs of the confusion and indecision 
associated with management ratios that are too broad. He concluded that the costs of more 
horizontal organizational structures often outweigh the benefits. Wider spans of control mean 
more self-management (Davision, Management Span of Control, 23). In the years following 
Urwick’s article, the effective span of control had been typically understood to be a dozen or less 
(see Power to the Edge, 42), although some argue as low as three to six. See Jon R. Katzenbach 
and Douglas K. Smith. The Discipline of Teams: A Mindbook-Workbook for Delivering Small 
Group Performance (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2001). In 1988, Peter Drucker 
recommended a ratio of one to seven. 
 12
size of an organization, and type of work.24  Within the past several decades, the 
developing trend in the field favors significantly increased management ratios, 
also referred to as more horizontal organizational structures.25  Some believe 
that more horizontal organizations are more effective simply as a matter of fact,26 
while other proponents of horizontal organizational structures view new 
                                            
24 Davison, Management Span of Control, 22. See e.g., The Saratoga Institute Workforce 
Diagnostic System Benchmarking Reports 2001, reporting a median management ratio of one to 
16 in the healthcare sector, but only one to four in information services; and one manager to four 
employees in companies with 500 or less employees, but one to nine in companies with 2,000 to 
5,000 employees. While discussions of span of control often centered on pinpointing the optimal 
number of subordinates, a number of factors may influence the span of control most appropriate 
for a given management position. Factors identifies as likely altering the span of management 
include: job complexity, similarity of subordinate jobs, physical proximity of subordinates, abilities 
of employees, abilities of the manager, and technology. 
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/management/Sc-Str/Span-of-Control.html (accessed 
September 15, 2008). 
25 Many organizational theorists have argued that organizations that are structured vertically 
can no longer operate effectively in today’s changing environment. In 1992, Frank Ostroff and 
Douglas Smith presented the framework for the “horizontal organization” in McKinsey & 
Company’s quarterly research journal. In The Horizontal Organization, published in February 
1999, Frank Ostroff predicts that by 2020, 10 percent of all companies worldwide will have pure 
horizontal structures, and 80 percent will be hybrids. One of the enduring ideas in organization 
theory is that bureaucracies severely limit the organizational flexibility needed to cope effectively 
with complex, ambiguous, and unstable task environments in Bigley at 1281. A growing number 
of managers are therefore experimenting with new organizational forms that purportedly achieve 
flexibility and reliability under turbulent conditions (organizational structures identified by several 
terms, including “hybrid,” “network,” and “virtual”). In Bigley at 1281 in D’Aveni Ilinitch and Lewin, 
1996. For a broader discussion of new and evolving organizational forms, see Child – 
Organizations Unfettered: Organizational Form in an Information-Intensive Economy. 
26 “The number of layers is a function of the span of control. As the span of control 
decreases, the number of layers that are needed (for an organization of the same size) increases. 
In such hierarchies, information needs to flow up and down the chain of command. This is true of 
policy information, plans, orders, and information about the battlespace (both reports about the 
enemy and reports about friendly forces). The more layers, the longer this takes and the higher 
the probability of an error or distortion.” Power to the Edge, 43 in “The Manager’s Span of 
Control,” ed. L. F. Urwick (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press. May-June 1958). See also 
Power to the Edge, 215-216. A traditional hierarchy has a topology that largely restricts 
interactions among members of the organization to direct superior/subordinate interactions and 
whose number of levels is determined by the limits of Industrial Age notions of span of control 
(maximum of five to seven). Its approach to command and control is characterized by centralized 
planning, decomposition of tasks, and control processes that largely rely on deconfliction. 
Hierarchies spawn stovepipes, which are vertical, tightly coupled component organizations that 
are optimized for a narrowly focused objective. 
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technology as the enabler of more horizontal organizations.27  When evaluating 
emergency management organizational structures, in addition to the discussion 
of span of control found in general organizational theory, any general or specific 
span of control guidance found in the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) must be also be considered since emergency management structures 
must comply with NIMS.  
1. Span of Control under NIMS 
On February 28, 2003, the President issued Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, which 
directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a national 
system to increase emergency responders’ ability to prepare for, prevent, 
respond to, and recover from domestic incidents.28  In response, the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) developed NIMS as a single, comprehensive 
approach to domestic incident management.29  Central to the implementation of 
NIMS, the Incident Command System (ICS) is “a management system designed 
to enable effective and efficient domestic incident management by integrating a  
 
 
                                            
27 See e.g., “Virtual environments,” describing an application of telepresence technology to 
the incident management domain that will enable a virtual incident command center with effective 
communication between first responders in the field and remotely located command personnel. 
See also descriptions of new paradigms being developed through technological advances, as 
noted in Power to the Edge: “One can view the history of mankind as a journey of empowerment, 
conspicuously marked at critical junctures by the synergic combination of a particular 
technological advance and an innovative social adaptation that together eliminate a debilitating 
constraint….Power to the edge is a result of technological advances that will, in the coming 
decade, eliminate the constraint of bandwidth, free us from the need to know a lot in order to 
share a lot, unfetter us from the requirement to be synchronous in time and space, and remove 
the last remaining technical barriers to information sharing and collaboration,” xiii. 
28 This document does not present the details of NIMS itself. Rather, it addresses NIMS 
guidance on span of control. 
29 NIMS is a nationwide approach to domestic incident management that is applicable at all 
jurisdictional levels and across functional disciplines. FEMA Emergency Management Institute 
Independent Study course (IS-1) “Emergency Manager: An Orientation to the Position,” 
http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is1.asp5 (accessed July 1, 2008), 2.3. HSPD-5 requires the 
adoption of the NIMS by state, tribal and local response organizations as a condition for federal 
grants and contracts. As a result, responders throughout the nation are currently working to 
implement NIMS.  
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combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications 
operating within a common organizational structure, designed to enable effective 
and efficient domestic incident management.”30 
Under NIMS, span of control is defined as “the number of individuals a 
supervisor is responsible for, usually expressed as the ratio of supervisors to 
individuals.”31  A manageable span of control enables supervisors to supervise 
subordinates, as well manage resources under their supervision.32  NIMS 
provides that span of control considerations are influenced by the type of 
incident, nature of the task, hazards and safety factors, and distances between 
personnel and resources.33  An appropriate span of control for any supervisor is 
defined as between three and seven subordinates,34 optimally not exceeding 
five.35  There may be exceptions, usually in lower-risk assignments or where 
resources work in close proximity to each other.36  When reporting elements fall 
outside this range, organizational restructuring is normally the recommended 
                                            
30 “Emergency Manager: An Orientation to the Position.”; Department of Homeland Security, 
National Incident Management System, March 2004, 7. ICS is normally structured to facilitate 
activities in five major functional areas: command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance and 
administration. See also Bigley, The ICS: High Reliability: “The incident command system (ICS) is 
a particular approach to assemble and control of the highly reliable temporary organizations 
employed by many public safety professionals to manage diverse resources at emergency 
scenes,” 1281. For a discussion of ICS as a hierarchical framework which effectively manages a 
network of agencies, see Moynihan, Leveraging Collaborative Networks in Infrequent Emergency 
Situations. “NIMS is divided into three sections, the Incident Command System (ICS), the Multi-
agency Coordination System, and the Public Information System.” A. Fagan, C. Moore, and H. 
Warren, Conceptual Model of Emergency Management in the 21st Century (Suffolk, VA: 
Evidence Based Research, 2005), 
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dtic/ADA463863.pdf&code=0cbc7a245f0e458d31fd8c5387bc
3821 (accessed July 1, 2007), 3. This thesis does not address the Multi-agency Coordination 
System (MACS) as a possible solution for emergency management organizational structures, 
since MACS is a strategic definition of an end-state rather than an operational description of 
structures or processes to achieve an end-state.  
31 ICS 100, Student Manual, Glossary, 12. 
32 Ibid., 3-46. 
33 Ibid., 3-28. See also A. I. Anderson, D. Compton and T. Mason, “Managing in a 
Dangerous World-The National Incident Management System,” Engineering Management 
Journal 16 (2004): 3-9, 5-6. 
34 ICS 100, Student Manual, Glossary, 12. 
35 Ibid., 3-29. 
36 ICS 700, 5.  
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course of action.37  Examples of supervisory levels that can be added to help 
manage the span of control include dividing the organizational construct 
geographically (divisions) or functionally (groups), or by creating branches when 
the number of geographical or functional structures exceeds the span of 
control.38 
2. The Span of Control Considerations Identified in NIMS are 
Incomplete 
In addition to the NIMS guidance that span of control considerations are 
influenced by type of incident, nature of the task, and distances between 
personnel and resources,39 there are several additional factors which directly 
impact span of control.  For example, the additional points listed below are 
examples of how the NIMS guidance for span of control considerations are 
incomplete: 
(1) SIZE.  The size of the organization is known to impact the 
effectiveness of span of control, with smaller organizations being 
able to implement more horizontal structures.40 
(2) DIVERSITY.  The diversity of the membership of the organization 
impacts the effectiveness of a given span of control.  A group of 30 
law enforcement officers brought together to establish incident 
command under NIMS can probably implement a more horizontal 
span of control than 10 firefighters, 10 emergency medical 




                                            
37 ICS 700, 5.  
38 ICS 100, 5-8. 
39 Ibid., 3-28. 
40 See Moynihan, What Makes Hierarchical Networks Succeed? Evidence from Hurricane 
Katrina, which concludes that the impact of Katrina called for a response network of such size 
and diversity that it was inherently difficult to coordinate. 
41 ICS Case Studies, 15. “Network theory and crisis management literature both suggest that 
large, diverse networks have difficulty resolving basic issues of coordination compared to smaller 
and more homogeneous networks,” in Provan and Milward, 2001, 418. 
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(3) FAMILIARITY.  The familiarity of organizational personnel with 
each other directly impacts the breadth of the permissible span of 
control.  Those that have trained together, regardless of functional 
expertise, can sustain a more horizontal span of control.42 
(4) EXPANDING EVENT / ORGANIZATION.  A rapidly expanding 
emergency management organization may be impossible to fully 
coordinate.43 
3. The Possible Futures of NIMS Span of Control 
Beyond supplementing NIMS span of control considerations, some 
suggest NIMS and ICS organizational constructs and processes, including span 
                                            
42 ICS Case Studies, 15. “Participants bring to the network the perspective of their home 
agency and their profession or training, which may clash with the perspectives of other network 
members. This creates a form of uncertainty about how members will behave and interact with 
one another. Joop Koppenjan and Hans-Erik Klijn, Managing Uncertainties in Networks: A 
Network Approach to Problem Solving and Decision Making (New York: Routledge, 2004). Bigley 
and Roberts (2001, 1290) note the difficulty of building shared mental models among members 
from different geographic and social locations who have experienced “different stimuli, learning 
idiosyncratic ‘facts’ as they construct situational meanings and mental models.” See also ICS 
Case Studies, 16: “Coordination difficulties followed when responders incorporated unfamiliar 
agencies.” 
43 ICS Case Studies, 19. Concludes that a quickly expanding network can become 
impossible to fully coordinate because as a crisis takes on a larger scale, more responders are 
needed, and as the crisis creates more tasks, a greater variety of capacities are required. For 
example, the Katrina network was so diverse that there was a failure to fully comprehend which 
actors were actually part of the network, what skills they offered, and how to use these capacities 
(In House Report 2006, 02). 
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of control, should undergo significant and fundamental change.44  For the 
purposes of this analysis, the validity of existing NIMS and ICS organizational 
constructs and processes is assumed, and any proposals for emergency 
management organizational change offered by the author will endeavor to 
comply with current NIMS and ICS guidance. 
B. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
1.  Introduction 
Emergency management is defined by the National Response Framework 
as “the coordination and integration of all activities necessary to build, sustain, 
and improve the capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover 
from, or mitigate against threatened or actual natural disasters, acts of terrorism, 
                                            
44 According to Moynihan, “DHS has promoted the ICS approach as applicable to all types of 
crises. This is a contestable proposition, and even a cursory examination of different types of 
crises suggests contingencies that will affect the efficacy of hierarchical networks.” Moynihan, 
What Makes Hierarchical Organizations Succeed? 3. Similarly, Anderson states that manageable 
span of control under NIMS is a prime area for the application of principles of organizational 
behavior; moreover “enterprise mapping and design techniques could be used to develop an 
optimal organization for response to emergencies.” Anderson, Managing in a Dangerous World, 
6. See also recent CHDS theses: “Hurricane Katrina Highlighted Serious Deficiencies in 
America’s National Approach to Emergency Management…When Viewing Our National 
Response from the Perspective of Network Theory and Knowledge Management, Specific Gaps 
are Identified in Doctrine, Organizational Composition and Technological Capability. An Agenda 
for Change to the National Response Plan and National Incident Management System Should 
Integrate the Strengths of the Network Design and Address the Critical Role that Knowledge 
Plays in Shaping Response Efforts at All Levels.” Barry A. Compagnoni, The National Response 
System: The Need to Leverage Networks and Knowledge, CHDS Thesis, March 2006. Also, “The 
March 1, 2004 release of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) mandated the use of 
Unified Command and Incident Management Teams (IMTs) for multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional 
incidents…The current curriculum teaches technical skills and ICS role responsibilities, and omits 
skills needed to build healthy team dynamics. Training for IMTs needs to include more than 
technical skills (“What to do”), and that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should expand 
the curriculum to include team dynamics (“How to do it”). Further, DHS need not “re-invent the 
wheel” when looking for sources of team dynamic theory, but need only look to and adapt the 
experience of business and academia. Over the past 20-25 years a variety of inter-organizational 
networks and Work Teams have been studied and field tested.” Douglas R. Templeton, 
Assessing the Utility of Work Team Theory in a Unified Command Environment at Catastrophic 
Incidents, CHDS Thesis, March 2005. 
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or other manmade disasters.”45  Numerous well-written summaries describe the 
history of emergency management in the United States.46 
Emergencies are most commonly divided into four phases:  recovery, 
mitigation, preparedness, and response.47  The recovery phase follows the 
response phase of a disaster; the recovery phase includes activities necessary to 
                                            
45 National Response Framework, 5. The definition in the NRF in large part reflects the 1978 
definition from the NGA: “Emergency Management is the coordinated and collaborative 
integration of all relevant stakeholders into the four phases of emergency management 
(mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery) related to natural, technological, and 
intentional hazards. National Governors' Association, Comprehensive Emergency Management: 
A Governor's Guide (Washington, D.C.: National Governors' Association, 1979), 
http://www.training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/Comprehensive%20EM%20-%20NGA.doc 
(accessed November 12, 2007). See also DHS, Lexicon, October 23, 2007, 9, defining 
emergency management as: The coordination and integration of all activities necessary to build, 
sustain and improve the capabilities to prepare for, respond to, recover from, or mitigate against 
threatened or actual disasters or emergencies, regardless of cause. Extended Definition: 
emergency management activities in response to an incident are a component of overall incident 
management and are aligned with parallel response processes associated with prevention and 
protection. Further, IS-775, EOC Management and Operations, Course Summary, 
http://training.fema.gov/EMILMS/IS775/indexMenu.htm (accessed September 2, 2008) states: 
The EOC provides a central location from which government at any level can provide interagency 
coordination and executive decisionmaking in support of the incident response. The EOC does 
not command or control the on-scene response. The EOC carries out the coordination function 
through information collection and evaluation, priority setting, and resource management. 
Decisionmaking at the EOC affects the incident response as well as the public response. The 
decisions made at the EOC are not tactical decisions, however. Tactical decisions are made by 
the Incident Commander and the Command Staff at the incident scene, 1 of 43. FEMA, 
Emergency Management, 2-8 states: “Organized analysis, planning, decision-making, and 
assignment of available resources to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the 
effects of all hazards…Coordinate resources from all sectors, ensure that participants operate 
together effectively, advising and informing the chief elected official.” There is not complete 
consensus on the principles of emergency management; for a good discussion see e.g.: B. W. 
Blanchard, Background "Think Piece" for the Emergency Management Roundtable Meeting, EMI, 
March 5-6, 2007 on What is Emergency Management, and What Are the Principles of Emergency 
Management (Emmitsburg, MD: U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2007a). Another 
definition, which pertains only to the public sector, can be found in the "Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act of 2006" (Title VI of H.R. 5441) (now Public Law 109-295) wherein 
emergency management is defined as "…the governmental function that coordinates and 
integrates all activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the capability to prepare for, 
protect against, respond to, recover from or mitigate against threatened or actual natural 
disasters, acts of terrorism or other man-made disasters" in Background Think Piece - What is 
Emergency Management, 3, footnote 3. 
46 For a crisp historical summary, see “Conceptual Model,” 1-4, Tracing Emergency 
Management from its Civil Defense Roots to Post-9/11 Constructs. See also Blanchard, American 
Civil Defense 1945 - 1984: The Evolution of Programs and Policies Volume 2 Number 2 
(Emmitsburg, Maryland, 1985. See also M. Hite, National Research Council, “A Summary to the 
Disasters Roundtable,” The Emergency Manager of the Future Summary of a Workshop June 13, 
2003, Washington, D.C., 2003, http://books.naedu/books/NI000431/html/index.html (accessed 
June 11, 2007), 5-6. 
47 First done in 1978 NGA report. 
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restore the jurisdiction to normal.48  Following recovery, the next phase is 
mitigation.  In its Guide for All-hazard Emergency Operations Planning, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides that “mitigation 
actions involve lasting, often permanent, reduction of exposure to, probability of, 
or potential loss from hazard events.”49  Preparedness includes the development 
of plans, conducting exercises, and pre-event resource coordination which 
enables jurisdictions to face emergency threats that have not been mitigated.50  
To accomplish these goals, preparedness involves 10 basic functions.51 
According to FEMA, response begins when an emergency event is 
imminent or immediately after the event occurs.52  The response phase is divided 
into five stages, with numerous specific emergency management sub-elements 
                                            
48 FEMA Emergency Manager, 6-1. Recovery activities are classified as short-term and long-
term. 
49 Ibid., 3-1, 3-2 - 3-13. Mitigation begins with hazards identification and vulnerability 
analyses, followed by the appropriate application of mitigation tools such as codes and 
ordinances, structural measures, financial measures, information, land use planning and mapping 
and inspections. 
50 Ibid., 2-16 - 2-20. 
51 Function 1: Mobilizing Emergency Personnel and Resources; Functions 2 and 3: Warning 
the Public and Taking Protective Action; Function 4: Caring for Victims; Function 5: Assessing the 
Damage; Function 6: Restoring Essential Public Services; Function 7: Informing the Public; 
Function 8: Record Keeping; Function 9: Planning for Recovery; Function 10: Coordinating 
Emergency Management Activities. Ibid. A significant component of preparedness is the 
development of plans, conducting exercises, and pre-event resource coordination which enables 
jurisdictions to face emergency threats that have not been mitigated. Ibid., 4-1. These include 
administrative plans, mitigation plans, long-term recovery plans, and standard operating 
procedures. Ibid., 4-3. More recent planning guidance can be found in FEMA’s Comprehensive 
Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101, Producing Emergency Plans, A Guide for All-Hazard 
Emergency Operations Planning for State, Territorial, Local and Tribal Governments, Interim 
Version 1.0, August 1, 2008.  
52 FEMA Emergency Management, 3.12.  
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within each stage.53  The emergency manager during the response phase must 
ensure effective activation of the EOC, which includes alerting EOC personnel; 
activating communications equipment and support facilities; starting the message 
flow system; the use of logs, maps, and status boards; preparing a shift 
schedule; announcing of briefing schedules; providing staff necessities; 
controlling access to the EOC; developing and implementing a media plan; and 
assessing and reporting damage.54  That is not to say that the only emergency 
management actions during an incident are response activities.  In fact, 
emergency management actions during an incident, while centered on response, 
also include mitigation, preparedness, and recovery.55  Nevertheless, resource 
coordination is the key function of emergency management not only during the 
response phase of an incident, but at all times.56 When viewed from this 






                                            
53 FEMA Emergency Management, 3.12-3.13, 5-2. The five stages of response to an 
emergency or disaster are (1) Alerting and notification, (2) Warning, (3) Protecting the citizens 
and property, (4) Providing for the public welfare, and (5) Restoration. See also: Response 
encompasses the activities that address the short-term, direct effects of an incident. Response 
also includes the execution of EOPs and of incident mitigation activities designed to limit the loss 
of life, personal injury, property damage, and unfavorable outcomes. As indicated by the situation, 
response activities include applying intelligence and other information to lessen the effects or 
consequences of an incident; increasing security operations; continuing investigations into the 
nature and source of the threat; ongoing public health and agricultural surveillance and testing 
processes, immunizations, isolation, or quarantine; specific law enforcement operations aimed at 
preempting, interdicting, or disrupting illegal activity, and apprehending actual perpetrators and 
bringing them to justice; restoring critical infrastructure (e.g., utilities); ensuring continuity of 
critical services (e.g., law enforcement, public works). In other words, response involves putting 
preparedness plans into action.  
54 Ibid., 5-8 - 5-24. 
55 Ibid., 3.2. 
56 Ibid., 3.9. The key function of EOC personnel is to ensure that those who are located at 
the scene have the resources (i.e., personnel, tools, and equipment) they need for the response. 
See also the State of Vermont Emergency Operations Plan, Basic Plan, 39: “State-level 
emergency response coordination is the primary function of Vermont Emergency Management.” 
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those core situational awareness and resource coordination activities that are 
performed during emergencies, and those program activities that continue on a 
day-to-day basis.57 
Several authors propose new organizational paradigms for the emergency 
management structures of the future.58  For example, researchers R.O. 
Sendzimir and J. Weichselgartner have identified a paradox which calls into 
question existing tools and techniques for disaster management, considering that 
supposed improvements in knowledge and technique have not stemmed or 
reversed upward trends in increased disaster loss statistics.59  Although it would 
be tempting to argue for new and as yet untested emergency management 
                                            
57 FEMA Emergency Management, 3.1.; FEMA Emergency Management, 7.1. Another 
classification of emergency management activities is to divide them into three groups, pre-
incident activities, incident activities and post-incident activities: An emergency management 
program examines potential emergencies and disasters based on the risks posed by likely 
hazards; develops and implements programs aimed toward reducing the impact of these events 
on the community, prepares for those risks that cannot be eliminated; and prescribes the actions 
required to deal with the consequences of actual events and to recover from those events. The 
NRP addresses threats and incidents by coordinating: Pre-incident activities, such as information 
sharing, threat identification, planning, and readiness exercises. Incident activities that include 
lifesaving missions and critical infrastructure support protections. Post-incident activities that help 
people and communities recover and rebuild for a safer future.  
58 R. O. Schneider, A Strategic Overview of the "New" Emergency Management 
(Emmitsburg, MD: Emergency Management Institute, 2003), 
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dhs/nps23-091207-
15.pdf&code=70bcfc56b253866451292e4bb3d7f298 (accessed January 5, 2008). Ibid., 2, 
“Important national security concerns aside, the emergency management profession is presently 
confronted with the challenge to manage new realities. The analysis presented herein will 
maintain that this requires expanding the role of the emergency management function beyond its 
traditional scope.”  
59 J. Sendzimir and J. Weichselgartner, “Enhancing Short-Term Response with Large-Scale 
Perspectives” (paper presented at the Toward an International Model System - A Public Entity 
Risk Institute Symposium, Fairfax, VA, 2003), https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/nonprof/nps11-
121603-44.pdf&code=8f12968e2c3183ab2491d649f2c61fa1 (accessed January 5, 2008). We 
recommend to broaden the focus of emergency management such that we simultaneously 
increase capacity of emergency response while working between crises to increase the resilience 
and adaptability of society to disturbances and hazards. This requires integrating management 
and development policy over the short-, medium-, and long-term, as well as generation and 
adoption of paradigms that reflect our emerging understanding of processes operating at a variety 
of temporal and spatial scales. New ideas and techniques require improved inter-disciplinary 
communication and cooperative research frameworks such as Integrated Assessment and/or 
Adaptive Management. 
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organizational paradigms to keep pace with a rapidly changing world,60 this 
thesis assumes the validity of the established emergency management 
organizational theory, and develops courses of action which endeavor to 
optimize the core functions for emergency management organizational 
structures, including span of control, performed during the response phase of an 
emergency. 
2.   Emergency Management Organizational Structures and NIMS 
Emergency management agencies have organizational structures 
designed to accomplish response functions.  An EOC is the physical location for 
the coordination of information and resources to support the incident.61 The 
Emergency Management Director (EMD) oversees EOC structures and 
                                            
60 See e.g., David A. McEntire, “The Status of Emergency Management Theory: Issues, 
Barriers, and Recommendations for Improved Scholarship” (paper presented at the FEMA Higher 
Education Conference, June 8, 2004, Emmitsburg, MD, 2004). “A massive transformation is 
taking place in emergency management right now. For good or for bad, the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks on the United States have resulted in a significant reformulation of the purpose 
and nature of emergency management….The demands placed on emergency managers have 
risen.” See also Richard Andrews, “Emergency Management 2005: New Structures & New 
Challenges” (paper presented to InfaGard 2005 National Conference); Richard Sylves, “Why 
Revolutionary Change is Needed in Emergency Management” (paper presented at the 8th Annual 
Emergency Management Higher Education Conference, June 7-9, 2005); Moore Fagan and 
Warren, “Conceptual Model of Emergency Management in the 21st Century” (paper presented at 
the 10th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium). 
61 FEMA Emergency Management, 6.14. The EOC does not provide on-scene management 
but manages the overall event through five key functions: 1. Direction and control (broad 
guidance, not tactical—tactical direction and control rests with the Incident Commander at the 
scene). 2. Situation assessment. 3. Coordination. 4. Priority setting. 5. Resource management. 
See also Anderson, Managing in a Dangerous World, 6-7. The EOC establishes “a central 
location from which government, at any level, can provide interagency coordination and executive 
decision making for managing a major response and recovery effort while providing other 
essential services simultaneously.” Anderson, 7, in Compton, 2004. Given that emergency 
management does not control in the sense of on-scene management and the primacy of 
coordination for emergency management functions, rather than using the prevalent phrase “span 
of control,” with respect to the analysis of emergency management organizational structures the 
author of this paper was tempted to coin a new phrase “span of coordination.” The phrase “span 
of coordination” is not currently found in the 1220-page document “Guide to Emergency 
Management and Related Terms, Definitions, Concepts, Acronyms, Organizations, Programs, 
Guidance, Executive Orders & Legislation, A Tutorial on Emergency Management, Broadly 
Defined, Past and Present, © 2007 B. Wayne Blanchard, B. Wayne Blanchard, Ph.D., CEM, June 
18, 2008. 
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processes, in accordance with NIMS.62  As recently as February 2006, FEMA’s 
guidance was that the ICS organizational construct of Operations, Plans, 
Logistics, and Administration/Finance integrates emergency management 
functions.63  Presumably, under this guidance, the four mandatory sections are 
scaleable to the incident, with the emergency management organizational 
structure retaining the ability to grow by functions, divisions, or branches.  
However, FEMA IS-775, dated August 2008, states the following:  “NIMS 
requires all jurisdictions to adopt ICS as its incident management system.  NIMS 
does not require EOCs to adopt ICS as their organizational structure.  An EOC 
should be organized to facilitate effective operations,” (emphasis in original).64  
The EOC is charged with maintaining a manageable span of control, which can 
be defined as “the number of individuals or resources that one supervisor can 
manage effectively during an incident.”65 
The National Response Framework and most state Emergency 
Operations Plans apply a functional approach that groups capabilities into 
Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) to provide the planning, support, 
                                            
62 See e.g., the New Mexico Emergency Operations Plan (2007), Main Plan, 9: “The EOC 
Director, assigned by the State Director of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, is 
responsible for the Direction, Control, and Coordination of the New Mexico EOC. The EOC 
Director states the general control objectives and oversees EOC operations in support of the 
incident response. The EOC Director normally delegates functional responsibilities to command 
and general staff to maintain an effective span of control in achieving the objectives.” Vermont 
Emergency Management uses “the federally recognized National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) for command and control.” Vermont Emergency Management 2007 Annual Report, 1.  
63 The functions of an EOC are operations, planning, logistics, and finance and 
administration. FEMA Emergency Management, 3.9. See also the State of Vermont Emergency 
Operations Plan, (April 30, 2005), which complies with this FEMA guidance by identifying 
Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance/Admin under the title “State of Vermont – EOC 
Incident Coordination Team – ICS Organization.”  
64 Ibid., 9-13 of 43. IS-775, 9 of 43. IS-775 states that there are typically four ways to 
organize EOCs: (1) By major management activities, (2) Around ICS (with Operations, Planning, 
Logistics, and Finance/Administrations functions), (3) by ESFs organized into Operations, 
Planning, Logistics, and Finance/Administration areas; or (4) as a Multiagency Coordination 
Grou. 
65 Ibid., 12. FEMA Emergency Management, 6.9. See also JFO - Joint Field Office Activation 
and Operations: Interagency Integrated Standard Operating Procedure - Version 8.3, Interim 
Approval April 2006. The Joint Field Office (JFO) coordinates federal resources, and the 
Standard Operating Procedure states that “the JFO organization adapts to both the magnitude 
and complexity of the situation at hand and incorporates NIMS principles regarding span of 
control and organizational structure.”  
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resources, program implementation, and emergency services that are most likely 
to be needed during an emergency.66  Nominally there are 15 ESFs, but these 
do not report to a single ESF supervisor.  Rather, ESFs are functionally 
organized to enable the EOC’s ICS-organized operations, planning, logistics, and 
administration/finance personnel to coordinate directly to provide assistance.  In 
this sense, having 15 ESFs in a single EOC is not necessarily incompatible with 
the NIMS span of control guidance of three to seven subordinates for a single 
supervisor.67 
3.   Central Role of the State EOC 
All disasters are local, but state EOCs are the pivotal and critical 
coordination node during any major or catastrophic response.  Consistent with 
the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, states maintain many rights and 
functions independent of the Federal government.  Among these rights is the 
authority to manage domestic incidents within a state, with portions of that 
authority delegated to municipalities.  Governors are responsible for the public 
safety and welfare of the people within their state, and state emergency 
management organizations are normally charged by the state legislature and/or 
Governor to coordinate all emergency management organizations (local, state 
and federal) within a state.  In describing state Emergency Operations Plans, 
FEMA states that: 
The State Emergency Operations Plan establishes the framework 
within which local Emergency Operations Plans are created and 
through which the Federal government becomes involved in 
response and recovery operations. As such, the State government  
 
 
                                            
66 FEMA Emergency Management 4.7, 4.11. Similarly, for the State of Vermont, State 
Support Functions (SSFs) provide “a modular structure to energize the precise components that 
can best address the requirements of the incident. State of Vermont Emergency Operations Plan, 
Basic Plan, April 30, 2005, 34.  
67 The author was not able to find in the literature a statement that 15 ESFs are compatible 
with the NIMS span of control guidance, but all of the ICS guidance ascribes to both 15 ESFs and 
the NIMS 3 to 7 span of control guidance. See also FEMA Emergency Management, 4.7, which 
states that ESFs “apply NIMS concepts.” 
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acts as the coordinating entity to ensure that all levels of 
government are able to respond to safeguard the well-being of its 
citizens.68   
Although command is retained at the local level, state EOCs are the hub 
of local, state and federal emergency response coordination.  All requests for 
state or federal resources must be processed through the state.69  When 
incidents exceed the capabilities of local responders, state EOCs serve as the 
link between those who need assistance and those who can assist.  The state 
EOC coordinates with local governments to meet their emergency needs, 
assesses available state and federal resources, and helps the local government 
apply for, acquire, and use those resources effectively.70  Between municipal 
EOCs and the state EOC, most states have established county emergency 
management structures. 
C.   THE 45 STATES WITH COUNTY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
STRUCTURES 
In the United States, 45 states have county emergency management 
organizations.71  States EOCs may be the single focal point integrating the local, 
state, and federal response efforts, but some have described counties as the 
                                            
68 FEMA Emergency Management, 3.6. 
69 Ibid., 3.8. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 USC 
5121, et seq., as amended by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Pub L. No. 106-390, 114 Stat. 
1552 (2000) (the Stafford Act) defines an emergency that can result in Federal assistance: 
“‘Emergency’ means any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, 
Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives 
and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a 
catastrophe in any part of the United States.” Emphasis added. 
70 Ibid., FEMA Emergency Management, 4.2. Further, the State EOC “provides direct 
guidance and assistance to its local jurisdictions through program development, and it channels 
Federal guidance and assistance to the local level. In a disaster, the State office helps coordinate 
and integrate resources and apply them to local needs.”  
71 Forty-eight of the fifty states have operational county governments. Alaska and Louisiana 
call their county-type governments’ boroughs and parishes, respectively. Connecticut and Rhode 
Island are divided into geographic regions called counties, but they do not have functioning 
governments, as defined by the Census Bureau. National Association of Counties, 
http://www.naco.org/Content/NavigationMenu/About_Counties/County_Government/A_Brief_Ove
rview_of_County_Government.htm (accessed September 7, 2008).  
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“backbone” of emergency management in our nation.72  Of the 45 states with 
county emergency management structures, several states have created one or 
more additional levels of regionalized state emergency management structures 
with assigned geographic responsibilities, with a specified number of county 
EOCs within each region.  For example, California subdivided the Governor’s 
State Office of Emergency Services into three Regions (Inland, Southern, and 
Coastal), with each Region assigned a number of subordinate Operational Areas.  
California’s Operational Areas are drawn on county lines and include all political 
subdivisions of or within the county (e.g. cities, special districts, municipalities, 
counties).73  Florida has 67 counties, divided into seven regions.74  Indiana has 
92 county EOCs, placed in 10 districts which span the state.75  Pennsylvania has 
67 counties, embracing (at last count) 2568 cities, boroughs and townships.76  
This results in county EOCs in Pennsylvania interacting with, on average, 38 
municipal EOCs.  Pennsylvania’s 67 counties are organized into three State EOC 
Area Offices, each of which can perform emergency management functions.  
According to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Services Code, passed 
in 1978, each of the 2635 municipalities (the constitution states that a county is a 
municipality as well) must have an EOC, an emergency operations plan and an 




                                            
72 National Association of Counties, Counties Secure America: A Survey of Emergency 
Preparedness of the Nation's Counties (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Counties, 
2001). 
73 Richard Staley, Emergency Planning Coordinator, Lockheed Martin Space Systems 
Company, Personal correspondence, August 11, 2008. 
74 Arlene G. Crow, Emergency Response Coordinator, Orange County Health Department, 
Personal correspondence, August 11, 2008. 
75 Frank J. Kriz, Indianapolis / Marion County EMA, Personal correspondence, August 11, 
2008. 
76 Jim Messinger, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, Bureau of Plans, 
Personal correspondence, August 11, 2008.  
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the state with the largest number of counties in the nation.  Counties in Texas are 
organized into regions which function in a coordination roll and help with regional 
mutual aid and/or regional response, reporting to the State EOC.77 
1.   Virginia’s Unique Structure 
Of the 45 states with county-level emergency management structures, 
Virginia’s emergency management structure is organizationally unique since, as 
a commonwealth state, cities in Virginia do not reside in counties.78  Virginia’s 
140 cities and counties are divided into seven emergency management regions, 
and each region has an assigned Emergency Management Coordinator.  The 
regional coordinators do NOT provide a regionalized span of control for 
emergency management functions between Virginia’s 140 cities and counties 
and Virginia’s EOC.  Regional coordinators work with their assigned localities on 
a daily basis, and are generally the primary Virginia Department of Emergency 
Management point of contact for city and county officials for issues other than 
incident response.  All resource requests however, go directly from the city or 
county to the Virginia EOC for coordination, as do situation reports and initial 
damage assessment reports.  Regional coordinators provide support to the 
localities, which reduces the burden for the Virginia EOC. 
D.   THE FIVE STATES WITHOUT COUNTY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
STRUCTURES 
1.   Connecticut 
Connecticut, with 169 towns and cities, does not have county EOCs.  It is 
divided into five emergency management regions.79  Each emergency 
                                            
77 Governor’s Division of Emergency Management, 
http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/dem/pages/fieldresponsedirectory.htm (accessed September 23, 
2008). 
78 Information on Virginia’s emergency management organizational structure was obtained 
from personal correspondence with Bruce Sterling, Region 2 Coordinator Virginia Department of 
Emergency Management, August 13, 2008.  
79 The five regions have between 14 to 43 towns each. Connecticut’s Region 2 Regional 
Coordinator, Personal correspondence, August 20, 2008. 
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management region has a full-time Regional Coordinator.  Regional Coordinators 
are the “eyes and ears in the field for the Connecticut State EOC.”80  Regional 
Emergency Management Offices used to have the single Regional Coordinator 
as full-time staff.  Through grant money, however, a planner and a trainer are 
also assigned.81  When not performing functions during a response, Regional 
Emergency Management Offices perform mitigation, preparedness, and 
response functions.  The regional teams located in the five offices around the 
state assist in preparation of local emergency plans and are the primary interface 
with the local officials (local emergency management personnel and local elected 
officials) of each of the 169 towns in Connecticut.  There are also personnel from 
within each region, primarily full-time employees of various state agencies offices 
located geographically within the region, who are assigned the additional duty to 
perform ESF functions when a regional EOC is stood up.  When a regional EOC 
is staffed with regional representatives in ESF positions, this organization is 
called a Regional ESF (RESF).  In addition, each region has a Regional 
Emergency Planning Team (REPT).82  Depending on the region, Regional EOC 




                                            
80 Presentation by Connecticut’s Emergency Management Director, RISC meeting, Newport 
Rhode Island. 
81 Roy Walton, Director Operations for Military Support Connecticut National Guard, 
Personal communication, March 31, 2008; Region 2 Coordinator, Personal correspondence, 
August 20, 2008. 
82 ESFs are a part-time additional duty, most personnel are drawn from state agencies within 
the respective regions. Region 2 Coordinator, Personal correspondence, August 20, 2008.  
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Figure 1.   Connecticut Emergency Management Regions83 
2.   Massachusetts 
There are 351 towns and cities in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.84  
The Commonwealth does not have county EOCs.  It is divided into four regions 
for the purposes of emergency management functions.  Each emergency 
management region has a Regional Manager, with assigned full-time personnel, 
who maintain a Regional EOC facility that is prepared to receive additional staff 
when activated.  When local authorities deplete their resources and request aid, 
the management and coordination of emergency response efforts for the 
Commonwealth is performed through the four Massachusetts Emergency  
 
 
                                            
83 Department of Emergency Management and Homeland Security, 
http://www.ct.gov/demhs/cwp/view.asp?a=1903&q=295316&demhsNav=| (accessed September 
23, 2008). 
84 The Official Website of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, www.mass.gov (accessed 
September 23, 2008). 
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Management Agency regional offices.85  When not performing response 
functions, the regional boundaries are used by Massachusetts Emergency 
Management Agency for planning and administrative purposes.86 
 
 
Figure 2.   Massachusetts Emergency Management Regions87 
3.   New Hampshire 
The State of New Hampshire has 234 incorporated cities and towns.88   
                                            
85 The Official Website of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, www.mass.gov (accessed 
September 23, 2008). 
86 Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) Regions, 
http://www.mass.gov/mgis/reg_mema.htm (accessed September 23, 2008). 
87 Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) Regions, 
http://www.mass.gov/mgis/reg_mema.gif (accessed September 10, 2008). 
88 According to New Hampshire Government, http://www.nh.gov/government/local.html 
(accessed September 23, 2008), there is county government in New Hampshire. The State 
population, according to the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau, was approximately 1.24 million persons 
(an increase of 11.4% since the 1990 Census).  
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Figure 3.   FiNew Hampshire Municipalities89 
Each municipality is responsible for having an EMD who is responsible for local 
emergency management programs.90  The State of New Hampshire EOC is the 
facility that coordinates “a State response to any major emergency or disaster 
                                            
89 Jennifer Harper, Personal correspondence, September 29, 2008. 
90 “Local government has overall responsibility, by law, for the direction and control of 
emergency disaster operations within the respective jurisdiction. The local emergency 
management director has the responsibility for the development and implementation of 
emergency management programs designed to provide for rapid and effective response to an 
emergency situation. The local EM director should plan for the protection of life and property 
within the community.” State of New Hampshire Emergency Operations Plan Basic Plan, 22-23. 
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situation.”91  With one exception, during most emergencies all of New 
Hampshire’s 234 municipalities are linked directly to the single state EOC.92  This 

































(except Large-Scale Public Health Emergency)
 
Figure 4.   New Hampshire Resource Support (Non-Public Health 
Emergency)93 
The exception to the rule that all 234 municipalities are linked directly to 
the single state EOC is event-specific.  The State of New Hampshire regionalizes 
its emergency response functions in the event of a large scale public health 
emergency.  If there is a large scale public health emergency, New Hampshire 
                                            
91 State of New Hampshire Emergency Operations Plan Basic Plan, 22-23, 13. 
92 “Planning Assumption #5: 5. Each level of government will respond to an incident using its 
available resources, to include the use of mutual aid, and may request assistance from the next 
higher level of government, if required (i.e., municipality to State and State to Federal 
government).” Ibid., 7.  
93 Director of New Hampshire Emergency Management, Personal correspondence, (May 13, 
2008). 
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establishes regional Multi-Agency Coordination Entities with geographic areas of 
responsibility.  The Multi-Agency Coordination Entities manage requests for all 
resources, not just medical resources.  This is depicted in the following chart:   
 
























for a Large-Scale Public Health Emergency
 
Figure 5.   New Hampshire Resource Support (Public Health Emergency)94 
Under the list entitled “Assumptions”, the New Hampshire Emergency 
Operations Plan states that the existing span of control will be effective for 






                                            




 …8. Local and State emergency operations plans address 
the ability to direct, control, coordinate and manage emergency 
operations during multiple events. 
 …11.  Local government will continue to function under all 
disaster and emergency conditions.95 
In contrast, some authors have argued that we should not expect local 
governments to continue to function under some circumstances: 
It is important to bear in mind that some municipalities, and even 
some small counties, are rendered non-functional by a large-scale 
disaster. In effect, the governments become victims along with their 
citizens. This is especially true of those that depend heavily on part-
time local officials and have small professional staffs…In such 
situations, response and recovery must be managed at a higher 
level of government, at least during the early days after a major 
disaster.96 
Some state plans even go so far as to contemplate the failure of emergency 
management response functions at the state level.97 
4.   Rhode Island 
Rhode Island comprises 39 municipalities, ranging in size from 1.21 to 
59.54 square miles.  Although there are five counties in Rhode Island, there is no 
county government. 
 
                                            
95 New Hampshire Emergency Operations Plan, Basic Plan, March 2005, 8. 
96 Coping with Catastrophe: Building an Emergency Management System to Meet People's 
Needs in Natural and Manmade Disasters (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Public 
Administration, 1993), 83. 
97 “The state’s goal is to mitigate and prepare for the consequences of hazards, and respond 
and recover in the event of an emergency or disaster. However, state resources and systems 
may become overwhelmed in the event of a major incident.” Washington State Comprehensive 
Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) (Camp Murray, WA: Washington Military Department, 
Emergency Management Division, 2003), 3. 
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Figure 6.   Rhode Island Municipalities98 
The 39 municipal EOCs report directly to the Rhode Island State EOC.  
For some events, even this span of control may create challenges for effective 
emergency management.99 
5.   Vermont 
a.  Overview 
The State of Vermont is geographically the second largest state in 
New England (Maine is first).  Vermont’s population was 608,827 as of the last 
census.100  Towns, cities, and villages combine for a total of 251 Vermont 
municipalities.101  
                                            
98 Roger Williams University, http://www.rwu.edu/depository/university/ri_magif (accessed 
September 11, 2008). 
99 Lieutenant Colonel Patty Ryan, Director, Operations for Military Support, Rhode Island 
National Guard, Personal correspondence, March 31, 2008. 
100 State of Vermont Emergency Operations Plan, Basic Plan, 9, and 11, April 30, 2005. 
101 There are 237 towns, and nine cities in Vermont. Five villages overlay towns and assume 
responsibility for some municipal services within their boundaries. Vermont Citizen’s Guide, 25. 
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Figure 7.   Vermont Municipalities102 
There are 14 counties in Vermont.  In Vermont, the county has 
never assumed the importance that it has in states outside New England.103  
County elected officers are State Senators, Assistant County Judges, County 
Sherriff, State’s Attorney, and Judge of Probate.104  There are no county 
governmental bodies currently in Vermont with emergency management 
functions or responsibilities.  Vermont has 451 county sheriff, municipal police, 
                                            
102 Vermont Agency of Transportation, Online Map Center, 
http://vtransmaaot.state.vt.us/omc/images/TownCounty.pdf (accessed September 1, 2008). 
103 Vermont Citizens Guide, League of Women Voters, 36. 
104 Sherriff Roger Marcoux, Personal correspondence, August 14, 2008. List from VT 
Citizens Guide, 36-37. The County Sherriff has additional functions mandated by statute include 
the movement of prisoners.  
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fire departments, and emergency medical organizations, in addition to its 14 state 
public safety agencies.105 Public safety agencies employ over 18,000 radio 
communications devices throughout the state.106 
 
 
Figure 8.   Vermont Counties 
 
County 2000 Population 
Square
Miles County Seat Founded 
Addison  35,974 770 Middlebury    1785   
Bennington  36,994 676 Bennington    1779   
Caledonia  29,702 651 Saint Johnsbury    1792   
Chittenden  146,571 539 Burlington   1787   
Essex  6,459 665 Guildhall    1792   
Franklin  45,417 637 Saint Albans    1792   
Grand Isle  6,901 83 North Hero    1802   
                                            
105 User Needs Assessment Report, 1-1. 
106 Ibid., 2-1.  
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County 2000 Population 
Square
Miles County Seat Founded 
Lamoille  23,233 461 Hyde Park    1835   
Orange  28,226 689 Chelsea    1781   
Orleans  26,277 697 Newport    1792   
Rutland  63,400 932 Rutland    1781   
Washington  58,039 690 Montpelier    1810   
Windham  44,216 789 Newfane    1779   
Windsor  57,418 971 Woodstock    1781   
Table 1.   Vermont Population by County107 
b.   Local Emergency Management Directors 
By statute, local governments carry out emergency management 
responsibilities within their municipal limits.108  Each local government is directed 
to establish a local organization for emergency management.109  Each 
municipality either appoints an EMD, or the position defaults to an elected 
position, such as the selectman or mayor.110  Local EMDs are under the control 
of their respective local chief elected officials.111  Vermont Emergency 
Management makes available “Emergency Management 101” training for all  
 
                                            
107 NACO, National Association of Counties, 
http://www.naco.org/Template.cfm?Section=Find_a_County&Template=/cffiles/counties/state.cfm
&statecode=vt 
108 Local organizations are to carry out emergency management responsibilities within their 
town or city limits, and participate in the development of a hazardous chemical incident response 
plan with the appropriate local emergency planning committees and emergency management 
districts. Ver. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §6 (a). Local governments are authorized to make orders, rules, 
and regulations for emergency management purposes that are not inconsistent with rules issued 
by the Governor or state agencies. Ver. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §16. 
109 Vermont League of Cities and Towns Handbook for Vermont Town Officers, 1999. 
110 Ver. Stat. Ann. tit 20, VSA Section 6 (a). 
111 VLCT Handbook for Town Officers, which uses the term ‘emergency management 
chairperson’ instead of ‘emergency management director’, and ‘selectboard’ instead of ‘local chief 
elected officials’. 
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municipal EMDs.112  The training is approximately four hours in length, and is 
voluntary.  EMD turnover rate is approximately 10-20% per year,113 and there are 
some challenges in tracking and training Vermont’s local EMDs.114   
c.   Vermont Emergency Management 
In Vermont, as in many other states, the history of existing 
emergency management structures starts with civil defense, which was originally 
conceived as employing volunteers during wartime to perform municipal 
defense.115  In 1957, statutory authority was granted expanding the authority of 
the civil defense division in Vermont to include response to natural disasters.116  
In 1989, the statutes were revised to recognize that what was once civil defense 
had become, primarily, emergency management.117  This was the birth of 
Vermont Emergency Management with structure and authority that in large part it 
reflects today.  On the state level, Vermont Emergency Management falls within 
the Department of Public Safety,118 and the Director of Vermont Emergency 
Management is charged with coordinating all emergency management efforts 
within the state.119  Vermont Emergency Management’s mission during the 
response phase is to “coordinate the response of state and federal  
 
 
                                            
112 Robert Schell, Vermont Emergency Management, Personal correspondence, (August 12, 
2008). 
113 Ibid.  
114 Ibid. 
115 Vermont League of Cities and Towns Handbook for Vermont Town Officers, 1999. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. By statute, the state Emergency Management Director position was created within 
the Department of Public Safety. Responsibilities include coordinating the activities of all 
emergency management organizations within the state, preparation of the radiological emergency 
response plan, and liaison with other states and federal emergency management agencies. Ver. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §3. 
118 Ver. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §3. 
119 Vermont League of Cities and Towns Handbook for Town Officers, 1999. 
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agencies/departments in assisting local governments and citizens.”120  Vermont 
has a single State EOC, located in Waterbury, Vermont, with roles and 
responsibilities as defined in the State Emergency Operations Plan: 
Emergencies and disasters impacting Vermont can quickly exceed 
the response and recovery capabilities of local jurisdictions.  During 
the response phase of such events, the State Emergency 
Operations Center (SEOC) coordinates the deployment of state 
resources, personnel, interstate mutual aid, and federal resources 
to support local agencies.  As recovery efforts expand, the SEOC 
coordinates with impacted jurisdictions and the Department of 
Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) regarding the collection of damage estimates, 
establishment of recovery centers, dissemination of recovery 
information to disaster victims, and initiation of long-term recovery 
and redevelopment programs.  In support of disaster victims and 
impacted jurisdictions, the process for deploying state resources 
including response and recovery personnel and teams, as well as 
resource staging areas and information centers must be clearly 
defined and well coordinated.121 
d.   State Rapid Assessment & Assistance Team 
The State Rapid Assessment & Assistance Team (S-RAAT) is a 
stand-alone team, usually led by a Department of Public Safety representative 
with technical specialists as needed from the State Support Functions (SSFs, 
closely aligned to federal Emergency Support Functions).122  The S-RAAT is 
primarily deployed to coordinate responding state resources.123  In this role, the 
S-RAAT supports local communities or a Regional Coordination Center (defined 
later, this section), by ensuring interface between local, state, federal and private 
response organizations.124 In addition, the S-RAAT can be deployed to assess 
and report the immediate impacts of an event.  Further, the S-RAAT may co-
                                            
120 Vermont Emergency Management 2007 Annual Report, 1. 
121 State of Vermont Emergency Operations Plan, Support Annex IX – Vermont Emergency 
Management Field Operations Standard Operating Procedure, April 30, 2005, 1. 




locate with a Logistical Staging Area to support efficient mobilization of resources 
into the impacted area, or it may co-locate with the Joint Field Office to enhance 
coordination of ongoing response issues and recovery actions.125   
e.   Public Safety Districts 
In accordance with the changes to Vermont statutes enacted in 
2005, the Governor divided Vermont into Public Safety Districts (PSDs), directing 
that the PSDs correspond to each Vermont State Police Troop Area, as defined 
by the Commissioner of Public Safety.126  The resulting Vermont PSDs are 
“geographically and administratively” congruent with the four Vermont State 
Police Troop areas.127 By statute, each PSD is headed by a PSD Coordinator,128 
and in compliance with this requirement, the Commissioner of Public Safety 
designated Vermont State Police Troop Commanders as PSD Coordinators.129 
                                            
125 State of Vermont Emergency Operations Plan, Support Annex IX – Vermont Emergency 
Management Field Operations Standard Operating Procedure, April 30, 2005, 5. 
126 Ver. Stat. Ann. tit 20, Section 5 (a). 
127 State of Vermont Emergency Operations Plan, Basic Plan, April 30, 2005, 9. 
128 Ver. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §5. 
129 Ver. Stat. Ann. tit 20, Section 5 (b): “The emergency management executive in each 
district shall be known as the district coordinator.” Vermont Homeland Security Unit PowerPoint 
presentation, “Public Safety District Coordinators / Regional Coordination Centers,” slide. 5. 
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Figure 9.   Vermont Public Safety Districts130 
f.   Local Emergency Planning Committees 
Nationally, state planning initiatives include Local Emergency 
Planning Committees (LEPCs), which are appointed by State Emergency 
Response Commissions.  These committees have traditionally revolved around 
hazardous materials.131  In Vermont, LEPCs were created and assigned duties 
related to hazardous material incidents by statute,132 although as a practical 
                                            
130 State of Vermont, Department of Public Safety, 
http://www.dps.state.vt.us/homeland/resp_districts.jpg (accessed August 14, 2008). 
131 Standing Together: An Emergency Planning Guide for America’s Communities, 29. “The 
LEPCs are a Product of Federal Legislation,” State of Vermont Emergency Management SERC 
and Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) Handbook, March 2005, 1. 
132 Ver. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §32. See also “LEPCs are in the best position to assist local 
governments in developing plans to respond to hazardous material emergencies, “State of VT EM 
SERC AND LEPC Handbook, March 2005, 1; and “The role of LEPCs is to form a partnership 
with local governments and industries as a resource for enhancing hazardous materials 
preparedness.” State of VT EM SERC and LEPC Handbook, March 2005, 3. 
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matter many LEPCs have undertaken significant mitigation and preparedness 
efforts, including coordination of local all-hazard plans and active roles in 
exercise development.133 
Vermont’s 13 LEPCs are somewhat, but not exactly, aligned with 
Vermont’s fourteen 14 counties.  LEPC personnel include full-time state 
employees, part-time employees, and volunteers.  The LEPCs currently do not 
have the authority to perform resource coordination or other emergency 
management response functions following a disaster. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Vermont Local Emergency Planning Committees 
                                            
133 Personal conversations with LEPC Chairs. See also Kevin Geiger, “LEPCs Have Made 
Significant Contributions to Assist Communities in Local Emergency Mitigation Efforts and 
Preparedness Planning,” Regional Emergency Preparedness Compacts, Safeguarding the 
Nation’s Communities, 32. 
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g.   Regional Planning Commissions 
By statute, the State Emergency Response Commission (SERC) is 
authorized to create the number of Regional Planning Commissions (RPCs) as 
deemed necessary to assist regional emergency management response efforts 
related to hazardous material incidents.134  Along with and on the same timeline 
as the LEPCs, Vermont’s 11 RPCs have evolved to perform functions across a 
wide range of mitigation and preparedness-related tasks.135  Vermont’s RPCs 
provide municipalities in each region with capable planning services, and “should 
be first stop for local officials seeking planning assistance.”136  Representatives 
from RPCs have “worked in the Vermont Emergency Operations Center,”137 but 
there is no other documentation describing any formal emergency management 
response phase relationship with Vermont Emergency Management or other 
response function for the RPCs.  The RPCs do not have the authority to perform 
any emergency management response functions. 
 
                                            
134 Ver. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §33. 
135 On many mitigation and preparedness issues, RPCs are a critical link up to, and down 
from, the State. Geiger, Regional Emergency Preparedness Compacts – Safeguarding the 
Nation’s Communities, 33. See Ibid., 32 for a summary of RPC mitigation efforts and more recent 
contributions to preparedness planning. 
136 VT Assoc. of Planning and Development Agencies (VAPDA), http://www.vpic.info/rpcs 
(accessed August 23, 2008). 
137 Geiger, Regional Emergency Preparedness Compacts, 32. 
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Figure 11.   Vermont Regional Planning Commissions138 
h.   State Emergency Response Commission 
The Federally mandated mission139 of Vermont’s SERC is to 
“protect public health, safety and the environment by ensuring effective and 
efficient use of resources, to plan for the response to all hazards incidents to 
include natural and manmade hazards, and hazardous materials.”140  SERC 
membership in Vermont includes: the Commissioner of Department of Public 
Safety Commissioner, the Director of Vermont Emergency Management, 
                                            
138 VT Assoc. of Planning and Development Agencies (VAPDA), http://www.vpic.info/rpcs 
(accessed August 11, 2008). 
139 The 1986 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, authorized under Title 
III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, requires each governor to establish a 
state emergency response commission (SERC) to oversee implementation of the federal act. 
National Governor’s Association, A Governor’s Guide to Emergency Management 2001, 12. 
140 Vermont SERC Bylaws, 2/21/07, http://www.dps.state.vt.us/vem/serc.htm (accessed 
September 12, 2008).  
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Secretary of the Agency of Natural Resources, Secretary of the Agency of 
Transportation, Secretary of the Agency of Agriculture, Commissioner of the 
Department of Health, Commissioner of the Department of Labor, and 
representatives from local government, fire service, emergency medical services, 
hospitals, RPCs, LEPCs, and law enforcement.141 
i.   Regional Coordination Centers 
As articulated in the current version of the State of Vermont 
Emergency Operations Plan, Vermont’s Regional Coordination Centers (RCCs) 
are an organizational structure which will regionalize emergency management 
functions under specific conditions.  Although RCCs are described generally in 
the State Emergency Operations Plan, the concept is still being further 
developed by Vermont Emergency Management and actual implementation 
(such as equipping facilities, facility improvements, and training) has not yet 
begun.  Vermont’s plan states that an RCC “coordinates available state 
resources within Public Safety District(s) when the capability of…the SEOC to 
support multiple operations in the field is exceeded.”142  The geographic 
boundaries of these four RCCs therefore align with the PSDs, with a single RCC 
to be located at the respective Vermont State Police Troop Headquarters within 
each PSD.  RCCs will be activated post-event, upon the approval of the 
Commissioner, Public Safety or Designee based on the joint recommendation of 
the Director, Vermont Emergency Management or Designee and the affected 
Vermont State Police troop commander or designee.143  At that time, the RCC 
“may be staffed with State Police resources but usually will be augmented by the 
deployment of the S-RAAT.”144 
                                            
141 State of Vermont, Department of Public Safety, Vermont Emergency Management, 
http://www.dps.state.vt.us/vem/serc_members.htm (accessed September 12, 2008). 




E.   A SURVEY OF LOCAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT DIRECTORS 
To gather additional data for this thesis, a survey was sent to local EMDs 
in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont.  The survey 
instrument is attached as Appendix A, and the survey method and results are 
attached by state in Appendixes B through E.  Each survey was open for seven 
days.  Survey questions were designed to capture information relating to local 
EOC facilities, EMD training, and EMD experience levels.  Specific questions 
asked local EMDs to identify the amount of training they have received in both 
emergency management and ICS, to identify whether, in addition to their duties 
as local EMD, they expect to potentially also serve as incident commander or in 
other roles during a response.  Survey results were consistent with other 
research on local emergency management facilities and personnel.145 
When results were grouped by state, between 50% and 74% of the 
respondents had experience levels of six years or less as an EMD.  The majority 
of respondents had more hours of NIMS / ICS training than emergency 
management training.  The total number of disasters varied greatly by 
respondent, with the average number of responses to local emergencies in the 
tens, while state and federal disasters on average in the single digits.  100% of 
included respondents saw their potential role during the response phase as local 
EMD or local EOC Director (the survey summary excluded all answers from any 
respondents who indicated that they did not expect to serve as a local EMD).  
When grouped by state, on average between 33% and 57% of respondents 
(depending on the state) said they could also potentially serve as the Incident 
Commander.   
                                            
145 For example, the by-state results showing percentages of local Emergency Management 
Directors who also expect to perform one or more other functions during a response is consistent 
with Blanchard’s statement that “it is not uncommon to find local emergency managers who ‘wear 
other hats’ than emergency management coordinator, or their primary job is something else, and 
emergency management is ‘the other hat.’” Blanchard, “Think Piece” for the Emergency 
Management Roundtable Meeting, 8. 
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Dual or Single Role(Emergency Management Director/Incident Commander)
by Tenure as Emergency Management Director
 
Table 2.   Role by Tenure as Emergency Management Director 
Table 2 shows the degree to which local EMDs may be dual-hatted as the 
Incident Commander.  While the Chi Square Test of this distribution was not 
statistically significant (p=.136), an examination of the expected frequencies of 
the cells versus the observed frequency shows that more EMDs with fewer than 
six years of experience expect to serve as both EMDs and Incident 
Commanders. 
In all four states, it was likely that local governments had pre-identified an 
EOC location, and it was likely that the pre-identified EOC location has some 
improvements to enable the pre-identified EOC to perform EOC functions. In all 
four states, however, it was more likely than not that Incident Command functions 
were expected to be co-located with EOC functions during the response phase. 
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In summary, there are wide variations between municipalities with respect 
to emergency management training, experience, and equipment.  Some 
municipalities are trained and equipped, with dedicated facilities.  As is further 
described in the attachments, other municipalities report one or more shortfalls. 
During events of similar size and impact, some municipalities will produce 
outstanding results demonstrating emergency management success; while the 
same events will create more challenges for other municipalities.146  There is a 
significant probability that local EMDs may be dual-hatted as the Incident 
Commander, and although EOC facilities are very likely to have been identified, it 
is more likely than not that EOC functions will be co-located in the same room 
with Incident Command functions.  Following a disaster, even if local first 
responder infrastructure is intact, it is unlikely that at the municipal level there will 
be a functioning stand-alone EOC staffed with an experienced emergency 
management professional who is solely performing emergency management 
functions.  Local EMDs may be inexperienced, or serving in multiple roles, or 
both.  The fact that emergency management capabilities vary considerably at the 
local level should be included as a planning factor when developing state and 
regional emergency management structures. 
                                            
146 Without having collected enough evidence to document a pattern, there are anecdotes of 
both successes and less than optimum processes. An example of the latter is during the 1998 ice 
storm in Vermont, Major Thomas Palermo arrived as a member of the Vermont National Guard to 
assist at the local level and found the local EOC was having difficulty tracking and requesting 
resources, as well as accomplishing communications. He assisted the municipality in establishing 
an EOC: “It was second nature to for me to bring maps, phone log, easel paper, and other 
administrative products to be able to start status tracking and communications…The municipality 
that I worked with was not trained or prepared…on how to track operations or where to turn to get 
resources. We used our own SOP on how to track operations, logistic support, and administrative 
support with a format of reporting via verbal or electronic means.” Major Thomas Palermo, 
Personal communication. 
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III. A VISION FOR CHANGE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Leadership involves setting the long-term goals of an organization.  
Leaders identify what is important, describe broad themes and patterns, and 
convince people to move forward.  This end-state guidance, or vision, is the first 
step in the strategic planning process.147  As summarized by James Carafano, 
“when you are working in the strategic realm, thought should precede action.”148  
A strategic vision for emergency management in Vermont should therefore 
identify an optimized end-state.  The sections below describe a process for 
developing strategic vision:  (1) guarding against cognitive errors while 
developing a strategic vision, (2) determining which organization owns the 
process of developing a comprehensive strategic vision for emergency 
management in Vermont, (3) defining the foundational principles of emergency 
management which are to be enabled by the strategic vision, and (4) reviewing 
the constraints that define the realm of the possible with respect to strategic 
vision.   
B. COGNITIVE FACTORS 
There are several cognitive factors which should be in the cross-check of 
stakeholders when considering the development of a strategic vision.  The first is 
overconfidence bias, which is the documented tendency for humans to be overly 
confident in their own abilities to understand the present, and their ability to  
 
                                            
147 A plan is required for an organization or organizations to be effective. The General 
Accountability Office, the research and investigative body for the U.S. Congress, is blunt about 
the role of strategic planning. “There is no more important element,” GAO writes, “than the effort 
of strategic planning. This effort is the starting point and foundation for defining what an 
organization seeks to accomplish, identifying the strategies it will use to achieve desired results, 
and then determining how well it succeeds in reaching results-oriented goals and achieved 
objectives,” GAO, March 29, 2006, 15. 
148 James J. Carafano, “Preparation and Response: Ensuring America's Recovery, The 
Heritage Foundation,” September 20, 2003, http://multimedia.heritage.org/CONTENT/lehrman-
093003a.ram (accessed September 7, 2008). 
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predict and control the future.  The effect has been demonstrated in a number of 
different ways.149  For example, it is hard for individuals to believe the worst can 
happen even as it is happening. 
The second cognitive factor to consider when evaluating present 
organizational structure vice possible futures is satisfiscing.  Satisficing is a 
decision-making strategy that meets the standards of adequacy, rather than 
working toward the optimal solution.  No matter where humans are in the 
information collection process, we have a documented tendency to fix on the first 
adequate solution and move on.  The term “satisficing” was coined by Herbert 
Simon,150  who observed a decision-making error resulting in unrealized 
maximization due to lack of complete information.  The decision-making error 
occurs when an adequate solution exists, and decisionmakers then cease to 
have any further curiosity for complete information, which might enable best 
solutions.  Although Voltaire said that “the best is the enemy of the good”,151 the 
phrase can be turned here to be “the good (or good enough, in other words, 
satisficing) is the enemy of the best.” 
The third cognitive factor to be aware of is escalation of commitment.  
When new information argues against a currently selected course of action, 
research shows individuals who have publicly committed to the selected course 
of action are far less likely to choose another course than individuals who have 
not publicly committed to the selected course of action.  An example of this is the 
documented tendency for leaders faced with challenges to say “continue, the 
solution is just more of what we are doing.”  However, the selected strategy may 
be a failing strategy and not a ‘just not yet succeeding strategy’.  Logic dictates 
                                            
149 Ulrich Hoffrage, "Overconfidence" in Pohl, Rüdiger, Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on 
Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgment and Memory (New York, NY: Psychology Press, 
2004), Sarah Lichtenstein, Baruch Fischoff, Lawrence D. Phillips. "Calibration of Probabilities: 
The State of the Art to 1980," in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, Amos Tversky. Judgment under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 306-334. 
150 See e.g. “Theories of Bounded Rationality,” in Decision and Organization, eds. C. B. 
McGuire and Roy Radner (North-Holland Publishing Company, 1972), 1, 161-76.  
151 Voltaire, Questions sur L'Encyclopédie II, 1770, 250. 
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that we not let a previous course of action influence cost/benefit analyses in the 
present, and that we do not continue moving forward simply to justify past 
decisions. 
Beyond being aware of and guarding against overconfidence bias, 
statisficing, and escalation of commitment, there are other steps that should be 
taken to improve the process of developing a strategic vision.  First, if a working 
group is established, then it would be beneficial to ensure broad membership in 
the working group.  When a working group is chartered, policymakers should 
ensure there is broad functional expertise in the group; this creates more options.  
Members who might have information relevant to decision making should be 
included.  People should be encouraged to talk about their respective expertise.  
The working group should pay careful attention to the knowledge aggregation 
process.  Further, the working group could consider tasking one person to argue 
the pros of a course of action, and another person to argue the cons of a course 
of action.  Foremost, the working group should not immediately analyze the 
known, and then move to deciding what to do.  The better process would include 
information collection prior to decision-making, guided by answers to the 
question “What would we like to know?”  This prevents the group from reaching 
the premature conclusion that it has exhausted all options before it identifies its 
potential courses of action. 
C. OWNERSHIP OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP 
The SERC is properly authorized, and has the appropriate range of 
stakeholder representation and subject matter expertise, to lead the effort to 
define a strategic vision for emergency management in Vermont.  Whether the 
SERC itself or a sub-group of the SERC, or perhaps in a collaborative effort with 
the Governor’s Homeland Security Advisory Council, a working group could be 
established to review and summarize applicable principles of emergency 
management, and present end-states which further those principles in the light of 
existing constraints.  The charter of the working group could include direction to 
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evaluate whether any improvements to Vermont’s emergency management 
structures are required, and if so, then to produce concrete recommendations to 
enable achievable improvements. 
This working group has a number of tools at its disposal to assess the 
current capabilities of existing state and local emergency management 
structures.  First, considerable resources are available documenting best 
practices in emergency management theory.152  Second, a high-level 
assessment is provided by the National Governor’s Association.153  Third, a more 
detailed assessment is the Capability Assessment for Readiness (CAR), which is 
a self-assessment tool that state emergency management organizations can use 
to identify strengths and weaknesses in emergency response.154  Fourth, 
Vermont’s State Preparedness Report could serve as a tool.155  Fifth, another 
initiative to identify metrics for evaluating emergency management organizational 
structures is the Emergency Management Accreditation Program.  National 
organizations cooperated to develop the Emergency Management Accreditation 
Program (EMAP).156  EMAP builds on the CAR concept and takes it one step 
further.157 EMAP is intended to provide national standards through which 
                                            
152 See e.g., Public Entity Risk Institute, Characteristics of Effective Emergency 
Management Organizational Structures (Fairfax, VA: Public Entity Risk Institute, 2001), 1. Case 
studies…of numerous local government emergency management programs led to the 
identification of organizational characteristics that contribute to “effective” emergency 
management programs. 
153 Assessing the State’s Emergency Management Resources and Capabilities. The 
assessment should include answers to the following questions. Is the emergency management 
program comprehensive enough to meet the needs of the state? Are the goals, objectives, and 
mission of the state’s emergency management system being achieved? Can the state redirect 
strategic resources and help communities and citizens avoid becoming disaster victims? National 
Governors Association, A Governor’s Guide to Emergency Management, 2001, 12. 
154 Ibid., 13. The Capability Assessment for Readiness (CAR) is a survey instrument 
developed by FEMA. A tailored CAR might specifically address emergency management span of 
control functionality during a major or catastrophic event. 
155 Ross Nagy, Vermont Emergency Management, Personal correspondence, October 21, 
2008. 
156 The National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), National League of Cities, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Governors Association, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, et al. 
157 NGA, 13. 
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emergency management programs can demonstrate success and accountability 
and determine areas and issues where additional resources are needed.158  
Finally, simulations exist that replicate the complexity of state-level emergency 
management processes,159 and it is not inconceivable that the known nodes and 
connections between Vermont’s SEOC and local EOCs could be mapped and 
evaluated under a variety of scenarios.  Through any combination of the above 
tools, a SERC-chartered working group could produce a vision for the future 
foundational to enabling the National Governor’s Association’s recommended 
goal of maintaining a constant, high level of all risk comprehensive response 
capability in the state.160 
D. DEFINING THE PRINCIPLES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
The development of principles of emergency management is a deliberate 
process, and the items below are offered for consideration by policymakers 
reviewing emergency management organizational structures. Some descriptions 
of emergency management do not inspire us to think that achievable principles of 
                                            
158 NGA, 13. See also “A Framework for Assessing Regional Preparedness, A White Paper 
on Applying Emergency Preparedness Standards to Multijurisdictional Areas,” by The Emergency 
Management Accreditation Program (EMAP), April 2006, 2, which describes a five-step 
assessment methodology to help multijurisdictional areas, urban and rural, identify emergency 
management capability shortfalls and opportunities. Specifically, step 2 of the 5-step process is 
the “regional self-assessment (review of regional plans and activities)…The region will be 
required to conduct a self-assessment of its multijurisdictional planning and coordination 
structures and activities.” 9. 
159 The Georgia Emergency Management State Operations Center created a simulation that 
“models the information flow among people working within the Center, as well as the flow of 
information coming into and leaving the Center.” Margaret L. Loper and Bart Presnell, Modeling 
an Emergency Operations Center with Agents (Atlanta, GA: Georgia Tech Research Institute, 
2005), Proceedings of the 2005 Winter Simulation Conference, eds. M. E. Kuhl, N. M. Steiger, F. 
B. Armstrong, and J. A. Joines, 347. 
160 NGA, 9. 
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emergency management can be defined.161  During the response phase, the 
emergency manager must maintain situational awareness on hazards, the 
situation, operate with valid facts or valid assumptions in the absence of valid 
facts, develop a concept of operations including understanding local direction 
and control, effect communications including warnings and public information, 
provide guidance on protective actions, coordinate mass care, limited health and 
medical resources, and other resources as may be required.  This activity has to 
take place among a spectrum of stakeholders including local emergency 
responders, interjurisdicational responders, state responders, and federal 
responders (if required).  All of this also has to occur in support of the guidance 
provided by lead elected political officials.  In the face of these daunting 
simultaneous tasks, some emergency management structures perform better 
than others.162 
1. Full-time Emergency Managers 
Wayne Blanchard asserts that professional emergency management is a 
“science and knowledge-based full-time job that requires education, training, and 
experience.”163  A lack of experience can create confusion about what actions to 
                                            
161 The generic problems of emergency management endure because they are rooted in 
human nature, American attitudes toward long-range planning, the dynamics of power in the 
Executive Branch, and the short-term perspective of the American political process… Emergency 
management organizations must plan and train in obscurity and neglect with few resources. 
Then, in one brief moment, in full glare of media and public scrutiny, they are expected to perform 
flawlessly like a goalie in hockey or soccer, or a conversion kicker in football. It is a merciless 
context for a mission that is difficult at best. Coping with Catastrophe, 16-17. At the state and 
local levels, emergency management suffers from: “A lack of clear and measurable objectives, 
adequate resources, public concern and official commitments; low levels of public concern and 
support for events of low probability but potentially high impact…A lack of knowledge and 
competence in emergency management, and a lack of commitment to and finding for emergency 
management.” Coping with Catastrophe, xi. 
162 Jurisdictions with well-organized EOCs have several distinct advantages over other 
jurisdictions during an emergency because they (1) Serve as a conduit for information passed 
from the incident scene, through lower-level coordination agencies, to higher-level coordination 
entities, (2) Allow the Incident Commander to focus on managing the incident, (3) Promote 
problem resolution at the lowest practical level, and (4) Provide strategic guidance and direction 
to support incident management activities. IS-775, 2 of 43. 
163 Blanchard, Background “Think Piece” for The Emergency Management Roundtable 
Meeting, 24.  
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take during the response phase of an emergency.164  An anecdotal example is 
found in the 1978 National Governors Report Comprehensive Emergency 
Management – A Governor’s Guide: 
A series of tornadoes across the state inflicted severe damage on 
two medium-sized cities. In visiting both, the governor noticed that 
cleanup seemed to be further along in the more severely hit city. He 
found that the local emergency services coordinator was well 
respected in town and had worked out and tested an emergency 
response plan for early warnings from the National Weather 
Service. He had initiated installation of new warning sirens at the 
fire department and had coordinated health services, evacuation 
procedures, search and rescue operations, debris clearance, 
temporary shelter construction, feeding programs, and other 
response services. He had made particularly good use of trained 
volunteers. The other city had a part-time emergency services 
coordinator, who was not on duty when the tornado hit. Warnings to 
the city, as well as notification to city and state officials were 
delayed. The second city, although less severely struck, took longer 
to respond to and recover from the emergency.165 
A full-time organizational structure provides for an emergency 
management monitoring function staffed on a 24-hour basis. This allows 
monitoring of potential disasters so that governmental employees, and the 
general public, can be placed on various stages of alert as appropriate.166 This 
permits timely, accurate and complete understanding of the nature of a particular 
situation.167 
Finally, part-time EMDs have a significant probability of also serving as the 
Incident Commander.  Under NIMS, the duties and responsibilities of the Incident 
Commander performed at the Incident Command Post are both distinct and 
physically separate from duties and functions of the EMD performed at the EOC. 
                                            
164 Donald P. Moynihan, What Makes Hierarchical Networks Succeed, paper presented at 
the annual meeting of the Association of Public Policy and Management, November 2-4, 2006, 
Madison, Wisconsin, http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/appam/moynihankatrina.pdf (accessed 
September 10, 2008). 
165 NGA, 16. 
166 Public Entity Risk Institute, 18. 
167 Ibid. 
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2. Responsible for all Four Phases of Emergency Management 
In 1979, a National Governors Association report ushered in a new era of 
emergency management, by recognizing the close links between mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery.168  The concept of handling all types of 
disasters and their consequences was named “comprehensive emergency 
management” (CEM).169  The creation of FEMA in 1979 institutionalized CEM.170  
FEMA resulted from the consolidation of five federal agencies that had previously 
dealt separately with an aspect of large-scale emergencies.171  A professional 
emergency manager is seen today as someone who coordinates with and 
collaboratively integrates all relevant stakeholders into the four phases of 
emergency management (mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery) 
related to natural, technological, and intentional hazards.”172 
There is no reason to have to re-learn the hard lessons that produced the 
1979 report, which integrated the four phases of emergency management.  
There is no clear boundary where one phase ends and another begins, 
successful emergency management structures coordinate activities in all four 
phases, and the response phase should not be extricated to be addressed by 
distinct organizations.173 
                                            
168 NGA, 7. 
169 FEMA Emergency Manager, 1-8. See also Blanchard, Background “Think Piece” for The 
Emergency Management Roundtable Meeting, 10: “CEM is the central organizing principle and 
definition of professional emergency management -- all-hazards, all phases, all actors.” 
170 FEMA Emergency Manager, 1-8. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Blanchard, Background “Think Piece” for The Emergency Management Roundtable 
Meeting, 7. 
173 Principles of Emergency Management, September 11, 2007, 5. See also City of Broken 
Arrow, Emergency Management, http://www.brokenarrowok.gov/Index.aspx?page=44 (accessed 
September 12, 2008). “The four phases of comprehensive emergency management appear in a 
circular relationship to each other. Each phase links to the others. Activities in one phase may 
overlap those in the previous. Preparedness moves swiftly into response when disaster strikes. 
Response yields to recovery at different times, depending on the extent and kind of damage. 
Similarly, recovery should help trigger mitigation, motivating attempts to prevent or reduce the 
potential for a future disaster. The disaster phases have no beginning or end, so recognition of a 
threat can motivate mitigation efforts as well as an actual emergency can.” 
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3. Familiarity with Jurisdiction 
By integrating emergency management into daily decisions, and not just 
during times of disasters, emergency managers build the essential response 
elements of relationships and trust between stakeholders.  Protecting the 
population cannot be accomplished without building partnerships among 
disciplines and across all sectors.174  As Blanchard notes: 
Emergency Managers must actively reach out to and engage a 
wide range of stake-holders in their communities or organizations, 
do so on a regular and frequent basis, and do so meaningfully and 
seriously…These attributes characterize U.S. emergency 
management – building and maintaining relationships – and serve 
as the best means to build disaster resistant and resilient 
communities. This is the emergency management model and 
approach. (emphasis in original).175 
Thomas Drabeck’s study of local emergency managers revealed that more 
successful emergency managers form and maintain interagency bonds of mutual 
aid and cooperation.176  Trust is facilitated by past crises, preplanning and 
exercise experiences that build personal relationships and norms of 
reciprocity.177  Pre-existing relationships are one of the most important success 
factors in disaster response.178  Familiarity is created by having standing 
emergency management structures.   
4. Standing Organizational Structures, Not Just Plans 
Social science research concludes that the most effective disaster 
response utilizes standing organizations and disaster response structures that 
                                            
174 Principles of Emergency Management, September 11, 2007, 7. 
175 Blanchard, Background “Think Piece” for The Emergency Management Roundtable 
Meeting, 16. 
176 In his landmark study conducted in 1987 but still considered a baseline today entitled The 
Professional Emergency Manager, Thomas E. Drabek reports on a study of professional 
emergency managers in 62 cities and counties and identifies strategies and characteristics of 
successful job performance. FEMA Emergency Manager, 1-4.  
177 Moynihan, 24. 
178 Consequence Reduction: Response and Recovery, Volpe Journal, 2003, 23-24.  
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are as close as possible to routine organizational structures and procedures.  
This is one reason why it is important to integrate emergency management into 
existing organizations.179  The organizational structure should provide for the 
integration of emergency management functions into day-to-day operations; that 
is, emergency planning should be a part of routine activities and not something 
that is taken off the shelf when a disaster occurs.180  It is easier to plan than to 
bring plans into the management of an actual disaster.181 
The nation is pre-occupied with disaster planning, at the expense of 
creating robust, flexible, and scaleable emergency management response 
structures.  It is puzzling that despite years of research on organizational 
behavior, local governments continue to be surprised when procedures in 
lengthy, detailed plans are irrelevant to a real disaster.182  The paradox between 
extensive preparedness planning and less than effective response management 
has been attributed to several factors, including an underestimation of the need 
to plan for flexibility and improvisation in the crisis time response.183  
Preparedness is a concept routinely analogized with planning, but preparedness 
should also include pre-disaster steps which increase the ability of emergency 
management structures to be flexible and improvise in the face of uncertainty.  
                                            
179 Blanchard, Background “Think Piece” for The Emergency Management Roundtable 
Meeting, 21. See also Characteristics of Effective Emergency Management Organizational 
Structures, Published by the Public Entity Risk Institute, www.riskinstitute.org (accessed 
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180 Public Entity Risk Institute, 8. 
181 E. L. Quarantelli, “Disaster Planning, Emergency Management and Civil Protection: The 
Historical Development of Organized Efforts to Plan for and to Respond to Disasters,” in 
Interorganizational Relationships in Emergency Management, ed. G. Hoetmer (Newark, DE: 
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182 Public Entity Risk Institute, 8. 
182 Quarantelli, Interorganizational Relationships in Emergency Management, 19. 
183 Quarentell, Disaster Planning, Emergency Management and Civil Protection, 18. 
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There seems to be no recognition that plans have any inherent limits, although 
much of any response will inevitably have to be improvised.184  Blanchard states:  
One of the long-standing problems of U.S. emergency 
management, at all levels of government, is the selection of 
emergency program managers/coordinators from within the ranks 
of response-oriented emergency services…who fail to transcend 
their response-oriented backgrounds to develop truly all-phase 
strategic plans and programs…this response orientation devolves 
too often into a disaster operations plan-centric program rather than 
a risk-based strategic plan oriented program.185 
The focus during the preparedness phase on writing all-hazard plans is the most 
prevalent shortcoming in emergency management structures today, and it is 
found at the local, regional, state and federal levels.  The problem has been 
described as “the paper plan” syndrome, defined as the assumption that the 
presence of an emergency operations plan is all that is needed to respond to 
disasters.186  Having a written all-hazards plan, with event-specific annexes, 
without developing capabilities to implement the plan is insufficient to ensure 
adequate response operations.187  Exercises have their own limitations.  
Exercises are necessary and important, but the hard-working exercise planners 
across the nation cannot overcome the fact that exercises are simplified models 
of expected futures, where participants perform their largely pre-scripted roles in 
manageable bit-size parts where the larger systems are rarely tested to failure.  
Exercises cannot fully replicate uncertainties and unforeseen circumstances  that 
will present themselves during a disaster. 
                                            
184 Quarantelli, “Disaster Planning, Emergency Management and Civil Protection: The 
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186 “The Status of Emergency Management Theory: Issues, Barriers, and 
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Conference, David A. McEntire, Emmitsburg, MD, June 8, 2004), 17. 
187 Ibid. 
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Planning and exercises should make the system more robust and capable 
in the face of what we know and to the greatest extent possible multiple 
unknowns.  The State of Vermont has local “Emergency Management Directors,” 
not local “Emergency Operations Plans Implementation Directors.”  Trained 
emergency management professionals, at the local, regional and state levels, 
equipped with redundant systems, enable success in the face of the 
unexpected.188  We should be at least as concerned with the resiliency of the 
emergency management structure as we are with writing plans.  A critical 
component to ensuring a robust and flexible emergency management response 
is the fact that the capacity of the overall structure depends a great deal on the 
span of control at different levels.189 
5. Effective Span of Control 
Emergency management span of control is a principle of effective 
emergency management. To have a manageable span of control, supervisors 
must be able to “adequately supervise and control their subordinates, as well as 
communicate with and manage all resources under their supervision.”190 An 
Incident Commander is charged with supervising and controlling operations, 
while also communicating with and managing resources under his or her 
supervision.  Emergency management, by contrast, does not control operations.  
With respect to span of control for emergency management, the question then 
becomes whether emergency management is different from incident command to 
the extent that it effects the ratio of supervisors to subordinates.    It is possible 
that the NIMS span of control rule of between 3 and 7 subordinates, optimally not 
to exceed 5 subordinates, is incident specific.  NIMS guidance states that span of 
control considerations are influenced by the nature of the task.191  Emergency 
                                            
188 “The Status of Emergency Management Theory: Issues, Barriers, and Recommendations 
for Improved Scholarship,” (paper presented at the FEMA Higher Education Conference, David A. 
McEntire, Emmitsburg, MD, June 8, 2004), 17. 
189 Moynihan, What Makes Hierarchical Networks Succeed, 26. 
190 FEMA Emergency Manager, 6.9. 
191 ICS 100, 3-28. 
 63
management is a different task than Incident Command.  The anecdotal 
evidence is that even with county EOCs, many state EOCs currently have spans 
of control greater than between 3 and 7 regional and/or municipal EOCs. 
At some point, wider spans of control impact the ability to communicate 
and coordinate resources.  In other words, wider spans of control reduce the 
capability, responsiveness and flexibility of the emergency management 
structure.  If a major disaster occurs in Vermont, and 130 municipalities forward 
damage assessments and requests for assistance to the state EOC, does that 
mean that the other 121 municipalities are responding effectively without the 
requirement for state assistance, and are merely slow to forward damage 
assessments, or does it mean that the 121 municipalities are significantly worse 
off, perhaps to the point that response structures have failed?  How will the State 
EOC know the difference?192 
Wider spans of control impact the ability to perform all four phases of 
emergency management, the ability to be familiar with the jurisdictions, and to be 
able to build the critical relationships and trust that enables success during 
disaster response.  The span of control for Vermont’s State EOC, with its 251 
linkages, is the widest span of control for any State EOC in the nation. 
The principles of emergency management therefore include (1) full-time 
trained and experienced emergency management personnel, (2) who perform 
emergency management functions throughout all four phases of an emergency 
(mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery), (3) who gain familiarity with 
their jurisdictional area of responsibility, (4) under the umbrella of standing 
emergency management organizational structures, (5) with effective spans of 
control.  These principles should the development of emergency management 
structures. 
                                            
192 Some have argued that new technologies will expand emergency management spans of 
control. Having 251 local EMDs communicate SITREPs, Disaster Estimates, and resource 
requests via the internet is merely quantitatively, not qualitatively, different from having the same 
individuals communicate the same information via phone. County EOCs were not obviated 
nationally by the creation of the telephone. 
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E. CONSTRAINTS 
Emergency management constraints range from those the easily 
overcome, to the intractable.  A cost-benefit analysis performed in the light of an 
objective evaluation of constraints may yield the best solution.  The most 
significant constraints for emergency management structures in Vermont are 
statutory and fiscal.   
1. Statutory  
Vermont Statutes Annotated Title 20, Section 5, requires PSDs to align 
with Vermont State Police Troop Districts.  Currently there are four Vermont 
State Police Troop Districts.  Therefore, there are four PSDs whose geographic 
boundaries mirror the existing Vermont State Police Troop Districts.  The result is 
that any proposal to establish regional EOCs in the State of Vermont with 
geographic boundaries other than the current Vermont State Police Troop District 
boundaries will require either (1) re-alignment of Vermont State Police Troop 
Districts, or (2) the amendment of Title 20, Section 5 to de-couple Vermont State 
Police Troop District Boundaries from either PSD boundaries, or de-coupling 
emergency management functions from being regionalized only by PSD.  Due to 
the significant time and stakeholder buy-in required to pursue either of the above, 
both should be considered unrealistic and should be avoided. 
Further, there are no man-made or natural boundaries better suited than 
the existing PSDs to effect regionalized emergency management in Vermont.  
The possible boundaries, whether county, LEPC, or RPC, do not naturally lend 
themselves to regionalization of emergency management functions.  Most first 
responders, let alone citizens, are not familiar with LEPC or RPC boundaries, 
and although there may be some greater awareness of county boundaries, there 
is no county government to serve as lead elected official at the county level.   
Therefore any regional EOCs with county-aligned boundaries would actually 
have to be regionalized state EOCs, that simply have as their jurisdiction a 
county, which in and of itself could lead to additional confusion. 
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Integration is the emergency management concept that advances the 
notion that “emergency management needs to be integrated into or 
mainstreamed into other components of a political jurisdiction or an 
organization.”193  Emergency management operates within a governmental 
system, and not from a position of power.194  Elected governmental officials have 
key roles in representing their constituencies during the emergency situation.195  
To have county-aligned EOCs which perform functions in support of a chief 
elected county official, legislation would be required to establish more significant 
county governmental structures in Vermont.  The challenge of establishing a 
chief elected official, beyond the existing Sheriffs and State’s Attorneys in 
Vermont, probably is an insurmountable constraint.  
2. Fiscal 
When reviewing the possible courses of action, for each possibility it is 
important to define the portion of the cost-benefit curve that yields an exponential 
increase in capabilities, and the portion of the cost-benefit curve that yields a 
linear increase in capabilities.  Exponential increases in capability may occur as 
initial dollars spent, or only after significant fiscal investment.  The cost structure 
for organizational transformation is the relationship between costs and the 
quantity of the desired end state, which is probably not linear. 
The author is not aware of any full-time EMDs in any of Vermont’s 
municipalities.  The City of Burlington previously had an emergency manager in a 
salaried position with support staff enabled through state funding, but that 
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funding ended approximately five or six years ago.196  A review of the budgets for 
county EOCs nationally is informative.  Emergency management budgets for 
counties are small, the mean being just a little more than $33,000 nationally.197  
Clarke concludes that these figures suggest that most emergency management 
functions are being performed within other public safety units.198  According to 
Clarke, “most counties (71 percent) manage the emergency management 
agency’s budget within the general fund. Of those using a separate governmental 
fund, many cite a variety of grant funding and interlocal arrangements as the 
reason for the separation.”199 
There are several possible mechanisms available to secure funding to 
transform or enhance Vermont’s emergency management structure.200  The 
respective likelihood of success for each cannot be quantified, but possible 
funding sources and likelihood of success should be considerations for 
policymakers as they evaluate possible courses of action.  Without any 
prioritization, one funding mechanism is to acquire state funds integrated into the 
State’s budget.  This can be introduced either through the Governor’s Budget 
proposal, or initiated by the Legislature.  The next opportunity for this is spring, 
2009.   
The second possible funding mechanism is to establish an Investment 
Justification under the Fiscal Year 2009 DHS Grants program, and make the 
organizational transformation of Vermont Emergency Management one of 
Vermont’s 15 investments.  This would be due in approximately May of 2009.  
The investment justification should describe the business case, in other words 
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the value attained, and if possible include the peer review process, paired with 
DHS-performed risk analysis.  The key here is to propose in the request a strong 
solution; the request should not merely articulate a need.  For example, 
regionalizing emergency management builds capability to manage risk, and has 
a regional impact across a spectrum of man-made or natural disasters.  For any 
of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, effective response requires an effective 
emergency management structure.  The enabling impact of organizational 
transformation of emergency management structures should be shown in relation 
to the 37 Target Capabilities.  The current DHS grant focus includes planning 
and Improvised Explosive Device preparedness, to which strengthening 
response functions can be logically tied.  A question for additional research is 
whether there are EOC grants that have passed peer review process.  A key to 
success might be to eliminate “jump ball” grant making, where whoever does the 
best grant proposal (jumps the highest) wins.  There needs to be a collective 
grant-writing effort, which first requires building consensus with communities.  
Municipalities should contemplate joining in collective effort and submit the same 
grant requests to enable a regional solution to their mutual benefit.201   
The third possible funding mechanism is a Congressional initiative to fund 
an essential capability for the State of Vermont which is not otherwise addressed 
by federal budgets.  The next opportunity for this is January / February of 2009. 
Finally, existing RPC and LEPC resources could be realigned to enable 
funds to establish Regional EOCs in Vermont.  This solution should obviously be 
carefully considered, and if some portion of RPC or LEPC resources are being  
 
 
                                            
201 Michael O’Neil, City of Burlington Emergency Management Director and Fire Chief, 
Personal conversation, (August 12, 2008).  A similar personal conversation was held with the CT 
Emergency Management Region 3 Coordinator, who said that trust is “municipalities willing to 
pool money for the benefit of all,” August 20, 2008. 
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reallocated,202 it is possible that individuals who now only perform mitigation and 
preparedness functions could be integrated into a regional emergency 
management structure to provide across all phases of an emergency.   
F.   POSSIBLE FUTURES 
If the principles of emergency management and constraints are described 
accurately above, as a practical matter any strategic vision to establish more 
than 10 Regional EOCs in Vermont is off the table.  Within the realm of the 
possible, strategic visions for emergency management organizational end-states 
include (1) implementing the RCCs as proposed, (2) maintaining the status quo, 
(3) performing a gap analysis, and pre-identifying requirements for out-of-state 
resources, (4) strengthening the State EOC, and (5) establishing four Regional 
EOCs. 
1.   Implement the RCCs as Proposed 
To implement the vision of the RCCs currently articulation in the State of 
Vermont Emergency Operations Plan, four facilities can be assigned, one per 
PSD. These facilities can be equipped, primary and alternate personnel can be 
identified, procedures can be written, and training and exercises can be 
performed.  If implementation is in accordance with the current RCC construct, 
one possible scenario is as follows:  Dual-use spaces within or near the four 
Vermont State Police Troop Commands will be identified.  The rooms will be 
equipped with phones, computers, information display screens and internet 
access.  The RCC locations will be provided with back-up generator power, if 
there is not already back-up power.  An alternate facility for each RCC will be 
identified.  The Vermont State Police Troop Commander, and a designated 
alternate, for each RCC will receive the 4-hour EMD training provided by 
Vermont Emergency Management, to prepare them to serve as PSD 
                                            
202 Examples of LEPC funding include volunteers and donated services, funding from local 
government, grants, supplemental environmental projects, industry donations, and other sources. 
Vermont Emergency Management SERC AND LEPC Handbook, March 2005, 33-34. 
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Coordinators (in practical terms, the regional EMD).  State agencies that have 
offices within the PSD will be tasked to identify primary and alternate personnel 
to staff the State’s Support Functions.  RCC procedures will be written, including 
a description of the desired information flows.  Internal RCC procedures for 
building situational awareness and responding to requests for resources will in 
large part mirror the procedures established for the state EOC.  Several currently 
unanswered questions will have to be resolved and integrated into the RCC 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP):  How are municipalities informed that an 
RCC is being activated?  After RCC activation, how does information with 
respect to situational awareness or resource requests flow from the municipal 
EOCs?  Are the informational flows during a response, following the standing up 
of one or more RCCs, between the RCC and the municipalities, with the RCC 
communicating situational awareness and resource request situation to the state 
EOCs?  Once the procedures are defined and written, all RCC primary and 
alternate personnel will be trained.  Following one or more tabletops, an exercise 
will be held where communications will be tested between the RCC, several 
municipalities and the state EOC.  Exercise participants will build assessments of 
the simulated disaster and simulate performing regional resource coordination.  
After the exercise, participants will identify areas for improvement.  Armed with 
the knowledge of defined procedures, what not to do and what is yet to be 
improved, key personnel may potentially feel confident that they are prepared to 
perform the emergency management functions of the RCC. 
RCCs are to be activated only during the response phase of an 
emergency, when the state EOC is overwhelmed.  A benefit of activating one or 
more RCCs is that RCCs can regionalize emergency management functions 
within Vermont, and it is expected that members of the RCC would be more 
familiar with their jurisdiction than the State EOC might otherwise be.  
Implementation of an RCC during a real-world response, however, will face many 
challenges.  First, the absence of any full-time emergency management 
personnel will impact the ability of the RCC to be able to perform alerting, 
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assessment, resource management, and other emergency management 
functions.  The PSD, who will be performing regional EOC director duties for the 
RCC’s jurisdiction, will not be familiar with ongoing mitigation and preparedness 
efforts.  Personnel with such expertise will remain in the organizationally distinct 
RPCs and LEPCs.  The RCC will extricate the response phase emergency 
management functions from the other phases of emergency management, in 
conflict with the principles of CEM.  The RCC will not have provided for the 
integration of emergency management functions into the day-to-day operations; 
that is, the RCC would not be part of routine activities.  The RCC will be 
something that is taken off the shelf when a disaster occurs; and not only that, 
RCCs are taken off the shelf only after the state is well into the response phase 
of a disaster.  Further, the dual-hatted PSD Coordinator will probably be giving 
some if not all of his or her time to those functions required in their primary full-
time position as Troop Commander, Vermont State Police Barracks.  Beyond the 
challenge of being fully trained in emergency management as an additional duty, 
an additional question concerns availability to perform emergency management 
functions even if trained, given other public safety obligations.  If the event is of a 
scale within a PSD that the state EOC is becoming overwhelmed, it is hard to 
imagine that the Troop Commander would be other than engaged full-time in his 
or her primary duties in what would probably be the most significant disaster of 
his or her career.  Whether overseeing agency-specific response, or serving as 
the agency representative at an Area Command, the RCC will not have the 
undivided attention of the PSD Coordinator. 
The State of Vermont Emergency Operations Plan provides that the State 
Rapid Assessment and Assistance Team (S-RAAT) is available to assist in the 
standing up and operation of an RCC: 
For major or catastrophic events, the S-RAAT will deploy to the 
impacted Public Safety District.  The primary functions of the S-
RAAT include coordinating with impacted communities, the district 
and the SEOC to ensure that human needs are being met; quickly 
identifying outstanding response and recovery issues and  
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coordinating with appropriate state and local personnel on 
solutions; and assessing the need for expanded state response and 
recovery operations.203 
The deployment of an S-RAAT will solve the problem of having a dual-hatted 
PSD Coordinator, but the following questions remain:  If the S-RAAT is designed 
to forward deploy to provide early assessment, and to support overwhelmed 
municipal EOCs, is the S-RAAT available to staff an RCC?  The issue of the 
thinly-stretched S-RAAT becomes even more problematic if all four RCCs are 
activated.  In addition, there will be delayed response time when deploying an S-
RAAT, due both to geographic separation and lack of familiarity with jurisdictional 
hazards or interagency partners.  Just as things are getting to their worst, the 
state will be implementing organizational constructs which have never 
participated in a real-world respons of any scale. 
In summary, during the preparedness phase, steps can be taken to 
implement the RCC construct, but in a major or catastrophic disaster, the RCC 
may fail to enable any of the principles of emergency management.  This directly 
limits the size, scope, breadth and depth of the scenarios the RCC will be able to 
manage.   
2.   Maintain the Status Quo 
Maintaining the status quo can result from either inaction or conscious 
decision.  It can therefore be a likely scenario.  There will be no public outcry for 
organizational transformation of emergency management structures, unless it 
results from a high-visibility post-event after action review.  According to (first 
name if first time used) Walter Wright, “in many cases, the public never knows its 
emergency management or emergency services program is inadequate or 
inefficient until it is too late.”204  The next major or catastrophic disaster may be 
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weeks or decades away.  Maintaining the status quo will leave the state 
vulnerable to a cascading loss of situational awareness and inability to perform 
resource coordination effectively in the event of a major or catastrophic disaster.   
3.   Perform a Gap Analysis  
Existing emergency management structures can be evaluated through a 
clear-eyed gap analysis.  The results could identify the likelihood of scenarios 
which limit emergency management situational awareness, and the resulting 
reduced ability to form actionable requests for assistance.  The expectations for 
the functionality of emergency management structures can be adjusted to reflect 
reality, and requirements for out-of-state emergency management assistance 
can be identified pre-event.  Further, an SOP can be written for the integration of 
out-of-state emergency management resources into Vermont’s emergency 
management structure.  This SOP could include not only specific guidance on 
incoming assistance with respect to standardizing items such as communications 
equipment, but also information on Vermont’s emergency management 
structures, municipal structures, and public safety agencies to enable the quick 
integration of out-of-state teams.  Sourcing possibilities include the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact, the International Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact, or requests for federal assistance. 
The national resource typing list published by the federal government 
identifies resource management as a way “To provide operational assistance for 
incident management operations.”205  This allows the State of Vermont to identify 
pre-built packages under resource management.  In support of municipalities, the 
State of Vermont could plan for a specified number of teams, either severity-
based (moderate, severe), or scenario-based (flood, ice storm, other events).  
Examples of the types of elements that could be included are an EOC 
Management Support Team (Type II or Type III), an EOC Operations Section 
                                            
205 Under the 16 National Resource Typing Categories; used to arrange the FEMA 120 
resource types into their functional area. 
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Chief (Type II or Type III), an EOC Planning Section Chief, and an EOC 
Finance/Administration Section Chief/Coordinator.206  This is a robust package 
that reflects the fact that the team would be new to both the location and the 
interagency partners.  At the state level or PSD levels, pre-identified support 
requirements could include an EOC Management Support Team (Type I), 
consisting of an EOC Operations Section Chief, EOC Planning Section Chief, 
and EOC Finance/Administration Section Chief/Coordinator.  This team would be 
subordinate to and support Vermont Emergency Management, with specific pre-
event identified tasks such as coordinating with arriving municipal EOC support 
teams. 
We have plans for identified hazards.  If we know the limitations of the 
existing emergency management structures, it makes sense to similarly plan for 
impaired emergency management functionality.  The significant and 
unacceptable downside of performing a gap analysis and relying on EOC support 
to arrive from out-of-state is that is that these teams will not begin arriving until 
approximately 72 hours after the event. 
4.   Strengthen the State Emergency Operations Center 
The existing State EOC may be expanded to create additional emergency 
management response capacity for major or catastrophic events.  This could 
include redundant communications with 251 municipalities, additional personnel 
to synthesize information including requests, and perhaps regional desks with 
specific geographic areas of responsibility.    These desks could be responsible  
 
 
                                            
206 Typed resources from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, Typed Resource, Definitions, Incident Management Resources, FEMA 
508-2, July 2005, 16. For example, a Type II EOC Operations Section Chief has had a 
supervisory role in an Operations Section in a federally declared disaster, has organized and 
supervised subunits of an Operations Section in a non-federally declared disaster, and deploys 
with laptop, satellite/cellphone, and associated forms. A Type III EOC Operations Section Chief 
has training and/or experience in Operations for non-federally declared disaster situations and 
deploys with laptop, communications, and associated forms. 
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for maintaining communications with cities and towns in their respective 
jurisdictions, and upchanneling situational awareness and requests for 
assistance to SSF functions. 
The above EOC expansion would enable the emergency management 
principles of having full-time emergency management professionals, responsible 
for all four phases of emergencies, using standing emergency management 
structures.  An open question would be whether establishing regional desks 
within a single state EOC would address span of control issues.  Even if there 
were regional desks within the state EOC, the geographic distance would make it 
more difficult to gain familiarity with specific jurisdictional hazards and 
interagency personnel.  Finally, there may be institutional inertia against attempts 
to add full-time personnel to the existing state EOC.  
5.   Establish Four Standing Regional EOCs 
Four standing Regional EOCs, aligned with existing PSDs, would produce 
scaleable, flexible emergency management structures that could accomplish the 
spectrum of emergency management principles within existing statutory and 
fiscal constraints.  The Regional EOCs would have full-time personnel who 
perform emergency management functions during all four phases of emergency 
management – mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.  An emergency 
management professional would be appointed PSD Coordinator in each PSD. By 
statute, PSD Coordinators would discharge the emergency management powers 
within their districts.207  The Regional EOC would be required to have a plan that 
considers emergencies and hazards likely to occur within their jurisdiction, which 
describes functions and activities of the Regional EOC necessary to implement 
the four phases of emergency management.  The Regional EOC would have on-
call staff 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.  During an emergency or disaster, the 
Regional EOC would assume enhanced operations under the ICS.  Detailed 
regional EOC procedures and organizational chart would be published.  The 
                                            
207 20 Ver. Stat. Ann. tit 20 section 5 (b). 
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regional EOC would utilize SSFs, which identify sources for direct assistance and 
operational support that the local jurisdictions may need in order to implement 
hazard mitigation and preparedness or respond and recover from an emergency 
or disaster.  The severity of the incident determines the level at which the 
Regional EOC would be staffed. 
A Regional EOC might consist of three full-time personnel:  the PSD 
Coordinator, an emergency management planner, and an emergency 
management trainer / exercise coordinator.  These three personnel would be the 
public face of Vermont Emergency Management to the municipalities.208  They 
would be familiar both with the hazards, as well as the public safety 
professionals, in their Districts.  To better partner with municipalities in mitigation, 
planning, response and recovery, Regional EOCs could be authorized to engage 
in one or more cooperative activities, ranging from formal or informal 
agreements, funding, training, planning to grant coordination or administration.  
Regional EOCs could potentially collaborate, depending on their grant of 
authority, with private and non-profit sectors, state agencies or other Regional 
EOCs, FEMA, Environmental Protection Agency, Radio Amateur Civil 
Emergency Service, American Red Cross, hospitals, or others.  A careful review 
should be made of existing local, regional, and state mitigation and planning 
structures, thoughtfully evaluating whether Vermont’s RPCs or LEPCs should 
alter their structures, functions, or geographic boundaries in any way.  With 
revisions of the boundaries of four LEPCs and four RPCs, the LEPCs and RPCs 
could align with PSD boundaries.  LEPCs and RPCs could be then linked to a 
single PSD, with mutually supporting relationships. 
 
 
                                            
208 See e.g., comments of Mr. Fargione, New York State Emergency Management Office, 
during his presentation on August 26, 2008 at the New York National Guard Domestic Operations 
Conference: “NY is broken into five emergency management regions. Each region has a 
Regional Coordinator, who is the ‘face of SEMO’.”  
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Director Farr, Vermont Emergency Management, created an initiative 
which would align state emergency response functions by PSD, across all four 
phases.  Vermont Emergency Management had sought to identify four “key 
positions” which were being considered for funding beyond standard levels.209  
The objective was to have a lead within each PSD: 
Provide one regional (by Public Safety District) point of contact to 
Vermont Emergency Management…for all emergency response, 
recovery, mitigation and preparedness efforts between the local 
emergency management directors, LEPCs, Community Emergency 
Response Teams (CERT), school safety programs, RPCs, 
Neighborhood Watch efforts, and the Public Safety Troop 
Commander. 
Note the extent to which this individual would represent Vermont Emergency 
Management across many of the phases of an emergency.  For each of the 
Public Safety Districts, this individual would: 
• Provide coordination assistance to the emergency planning efforts 
of the regional planning commissions, local emergency 
preparedness committees, and regional health offices (through the 
Vermont Department of Health and Agency of Human Services), 
transportation districts, Forest and Parks districts, school, etc. 
• Serve as support and coordinator for public education, training 
opportunities and volunteers programs under the direction of the 
VEM Director and/or Deputy Directors. 
• Work with local response agencies and the State to increase 
collaboration among first responders, emergency management and 
volunteer groups. 
• Attend Mutual Aid District meetings as appropriate. 
• Support the ongoing volunteer efforts of the Vermont Citizens 
Corps Council and the oversight and outreach responsibilities of 
these councils by providing technical assistance, administrative and 
training services. 
• Assist in the coordination of the implementation of CERT training 
programs.  Coordinate with the Citizen Corps Councils to 
sponsor/host at least two CERT (2) training sessions per year. 
                                            
209 Director Farr, Personal correspondence, August 19, 2008. 
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• Coordinate with local emergency directors, town 
administrators/managers, law enforcement officials and planners 
that will be operating in the respective Public Safety District. 
• Attend regular meetings of each of the LEPCs and CERT teams 
and act as a liaison for VEM with information dissemination and 
coordination. 
• Coordinate with the RPCs to continue working with local 
municipalities to complete Regional Response Plans and municipal 
Emergency Operations Plans. 
• Meet with member(s) of the school crisis team to periodically check 
on needs for schools.  Disseminate material as appropriate. 
• Coordinate and facilitate Public Safety District meetings twice 
annually. 
• Act as the VEM point of contact for regional and local emergency 
issues. 
• Participate in exercises and drills as needed. 
• Participate in real events as needed. 
• Assist with DisasterLan training as needed. 
• Establish and maintain a statewide tracking system and resource 
list of CERT organizations, equipment and personnel to be used in 
disaster response.  Include animal rescue teams as identified. 
• Generate quarterly reports summarizing activities completed or in 
progress, including meetings and exercises attended, for the RPCs, 
CERT teams, Local Emergency Management Directors and 
LEPCs. 
• Provide quarterly updates to State Citizens Corps Council (State 
Emergency Response Commission) 
• Meet with VEM Director and Deputy Directors quarterly to discuss 
progress, initiatives, needs, gaps, and new or changing initiatives. 
Take the above list, add regional resource coordination functions during the 
response phase, and that inventory would constitute a comprehensive vision for 
a regionalized state emergency management structure that can represent 
Vermont Emergency Management across all phases of an emergency. 
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The Regional EOCs would be standing organizations, which could closely 
monitor developing situations, and would stand up anytime a municipality within 
its jurisdiction exceeded its local resources.  They would therefore become 
practiced in performing emergency management for the municipalities in their 
PSD.   Regional EOCs would be stood up first, not last.  The State EOC would 
coordinate between Regional EOCs, with other states, and the federal 
government.  The State EOC also would have capacity to assist any Regional 
EOC if the Regional EOC faced a potentially overwhelming situation.  Four 
Regional EOCs would preserve the S-RAAT as a mobile EOC team to provide 
on-scene assessment or assist local officials, upon their request, if they are 
overwhelmed.  Further, if an event does not impact every PSD, it permits staff 
from unimpacted Regional EOCs to assist in coordination of the response to an 
emergency.  The geographic proximity of the Regional EOC would enable faster 
response including marshalling of resources.  The increased regional 
communication across the four emergency management phases would result in 
increased emergency management capacity and capabilities.210  Beyond the 
efforts required to marshal the required political will, there appear to be no 
drawbacks or downside to the Regional EOC construct. 
Vermont can rely on existing emergency management structures without 
periodically reviewing what structures might maximize capabilities with limited 
resources.  This is an example of overconfidence bias; in other words being 
overly confident in our ability to understand the present and to predict and control 
the future.  If we implement the RCC construct without deliberative inquiry into 
other possible solutions, then that course might serve as an example of 
satisficing or seizing upon the first adequate solution without seeking the best 
solution.  To the extent we remain wedded to the RCC construct because there is 
public commitment to that course of action, then that is an example of escalation 
                                            
210 “Strengthening Regional Communication Increases Emergency Management Capacity 
and Capabilities.” Framework for Assessing Regional Preparedness: A White Paper on Applying 
Emergency Preparedness Standards to Multijurisdictional Areas (Lexington, KY: Emergency 
Management Accreditation Program, 2006), http://www.emaponline.org/?256 (accessed July 1, 
2007). 2. 
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of commitment.  The SERC is positioned to demonstrate leadership in performing 
a comprehensive review of existing emergency management structures and 
building an optimized vision for the future of emergency management in 
Vermont.  With cross-functional representation working collaboratively to produce 
stakeholder buy-in, Vermont will benefit from whatever conclusion distills as the 
best possible future for emergency management given existing constraints. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The State of Vermont’s current emergency management organizational 
structure will continue to serve the citizens of Vermont effectively for localized 
events, including flooding, ice storms, wind storms, snow storms, and other man-
made and natural disasters. Vermont’s emergency management structure, 
however, may not be able to respond effectively to major or catastrophic events.  
Major disasters occurred in Vermont, and will occur again.  The current span of 
control of one State EOC coordinating directly with 251 municipalities, may be 
unwieldy and unworkable.  Structural weaknesses will lead to failures to maintain 
situational awareness, to perform effective resource coordination, and to form 
actionable requests for assistance.  Organizational transformation of Vermont’s 
state-level emergency management structure may be required, and several 
courses of action are proposed for consideration by policymakers. 
Vermont’s emergency management structure should be continually 
assessed to ensure it effectuates the principles of emergency management.  The 
burden of emergency management requires a close working partnership among 
all levels of government, not a plan that is pulled off the shelf only during worst-
case disasters.  The lifecycle of disasters entails a series of overlapping 
management phases that include strategies to mitigate hazards and prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from emergencies and their effects.  Emergency 
management constructs should not attempt to extricate the response phase and 
assign that to an isolated organizational structure. 
To create a system optimized to enable the principles of emergency 
management, Vermont should consider establishing a regionalized emergency 
management structure, within existing PSD boundaries, along with associated 
personnel, equipment, and training.  The Regional EOC should stand-up first, 
whenever a municipality requires support beyond its locally available resources.  
Regional PSD Coordinators would be a source of assistance to local EMDs, and 
would coordinate with all local organizations to ensure an efficient response 
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throughout the PSD.  Regional PSD Coordinators would frequently provide 
assistance in the form of training, resource information, and sometimes 
equipment. They would be a main point of contact for local EMDs in times of 
disaster and in preparation for potential emergencies.  Regional EOCs would 
enable a clear understanding and statement of the organizational structure and 
processes, resulting in a consistent and cohesive disaster management strategy.  
When the next large scale disaster occurs, this new structure will then be ready 
ensure the state responds effectively. 
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APPENDIX A. SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
Attached below is the 10-question survey which was provided to a subset 
of the local Emergency Management Directors in Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, and Vermont.  Each state’s EMDs received the identical survey. 
 
 
 Emergency Management Director Survey  
1   
 
 
How long have you been a local Emergency Management Director
(EMD)?  
 
  2 years or less  
 
  2-4 years  
 
  4-6 years  
 
  6 or more years  
  
 
2   
 
 
How many hours of training do you have in NIMS / ICS? 
 
  0-10 hours  
 
  10-20 hours  
 
  20-30 hours  
 
  More than 30 hours  
  
 
3    
How many hours of training do you have in emergency management
functions?  (Emergency management being defined here as the
organizing, planning and assigning of available resources to support 
one or more Incident Commanders)  
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  0-10 hours  
 
  10-20 hours  
 
  20-30 hours  
 
  More than 30 hours  
  
 
4   
 
 
Please identify the total number of events that you have had experience
performing emergency management functions.  
 
Local Emergencies (total
number of events, even if
state or federal declaration) 
State Declarations (total
number of events, even if
federal declaration)  
Federal Declarations   
 
5   
 
 
What additional training would you like to have to make you more




6   
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 Other, please specify  
  
 
7   
 
 
Does your municipality have a pre-identified facility for your local 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)?  
 
 
Additional Comment  
  
 
8   
 
 
If you have a pre-identified location for your local EOC, are there any 
improvements to that facility which are specific to its EOC functions? 
(For example, phones, radios, computers, etc.)  
 
 
Additional Comment  
  
 
9    
Whether or not you have a pre-identified location for your local EOC, 
how likely is it during an event that your local EOC functions will be to
be co-located in the same room with local Incident Command functions:
 
  Very likely  
 
  Somewhat likely  
 
  Neutral  
 
  Somewhat Unlikely  
 




10   
 
 








APPENDIX B. CONNECTICUT LOCAL EMD SURVEY PROCESS 
AND RESULTS 
Connecticut has 169 municipalities with the responsibility for having 
emergency management directors.211  Connecticut’s Department of Emergency 
Management and Homeland Security website provides contact information for 
the state’s local emergency management directors.212  The local EMD survey 
found in Appendix A was sent to the 172 email addresses on that list, and the 
survey was sent in a manner that did not allow forwarding or multiple completions 
of the survey by a single individual.  Twelve of the surveys returned as 
undeliverable.213  4 of 22 surveys (18%) were excluded because the respondent 
did not check “Local Emergency Management Director (Local EOC Director)” 
under Question 6, “During an incident, how do you see your role (check all that 




My name is Ludwig J. Schumacher and I am a Master’s student in class 
0701 at the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense 
and Security (www.chds.us).  I am writing a thesis addressing 
regionalization and span of control of emergency management functions. 
  
As part of my research, I am sending out a one-time survey to local / 
municipal Emergency Management Directors.  Please click on the link 
below to complete the short survey.  Your time in answering the short 
questions below is greatly appreciated!  If you are not the Emergency 
Management Director, please forward the email of the current director to 
me at ljschuma@nps.edu.  Again, I sincerely thank you in advance for 
your participation! 
  
                                            
211 Presentation of the Connecticut Emergency Management Director, Regional Interagency 
Steering Committee, Newport Rhode Island, June 2008. 
212 Excel file entitled “Local Emergency Management Public Contacts,” 
http://www.ct.gov/demhs/lib/demhs/emergmgmt/local_emerg_mgmt_public_contacts.xls#48142 
(accessed August 18, 2008). 
213 Notice from the survey provider: “One or more of your recipient addresses are invalid. 
This can happen when an address does not exist, has been closed, or has been individually 
blocked from receiving mail by the recipient ISP.” 
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4. Please identify the total number of events that you have had experience performing 
emergency management functions. 
# Response   
1 
Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
50 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
30+ 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
16 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
unknown 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 




Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
12 
State Declarations (total number of events, even if federal declaration) 
2 
7 
Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
24 




8 Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) none as EMD 
9 
Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
6 





10 Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 1 
11 
Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
25 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
Can't remember 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
100 +/- 




14 Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) three incidents one local, two were federal dec. 
15 
Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
4 









5. What additional training would you like to have to make you more prepared to serve as a 
local/municipal EMD? 
# Response   
1 Continue to train but with locals who would be working with me in EOC. 
2 Need some time for this. 
3 Training on multi-jurisdictional events but not NIMS and FEMA courses (boring) 
4 nothong specific but a mock drill is one of our plans  
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5 Knowledge of Web EOC software. More table-top exercises for EOC designed by outside agency at no cost to us. 
6 None at this time 
7 more training as to file required federal forms to recoup for the town and its citizens 
8 on how to properly design and equip an EOC 








7. Does your municipality have a pre-identified facility for your local Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC)? 
# Response   
1 Underground facility with blast and fallout protection factors of 100 







8. If you have a pre-identified location for your local EOC, are there any improvements to that 
facility which are specific to its EOC functions? (For example, phones, radios, computers, etc.) 
# Response   
1 We have full dispatch facilities, interoperability, plotter, GIS, phones, bunks room, kitchen, etc. 
2 Room for radios, fax and computer. 
3 Need to see more improvements, money major issue in upgrading to todays standards 
4 Wish it was larger but is equipped well 
5 Added phone lines, computers, highband radio, 800 band I-TAC, FAX, overhead projector, whiteboard, office supplies, forms, tables, chairs. 
6 Satellite phone; Web EOC; better layout/organization. 
7 Dedicated phone, fax, and computer w/ WEBEOC installed 
8 
However, could be better and is being worked on with newly formed Regional efforts - Our State(CT) does 
not have County Govt. Function - 
We now have a "Regional" concept, 5 Regions- with planning and operations in the development stages, 








10. Any additional comments you may have concerning any of the above questions: 
# Response   
1 I didn't find question 4 the easiest question to answer....it's a guess.  
2 Iam also the asst. Fire Chief and EMT along with my EMD commitments all which are volenteer. Thats what needs to be fixed . 
3 Re # 9 if it is NAR (non address response) e.g.wide area event, the ICP could be colocated with the EOC, or in the adjacent conference room. 
4 The EOC cannot be effective if it is too close tho the ICP. The EOC needs to be away from the action to analyse the needed resources and order the resources needed for the incident. 
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APPENDIX C.  MASSACHUSETTS LOCAL EMD SURVEY 
PROCESS AND RESULTS 
Massachusetts has 351 municipalities, each with the responsibility for 
having emergency management directors.214  The Massachusetts Emergency 
Management Agency website provides contact information for the state’s local 
emergency management directors, with approximately half having email 
addresses listed.215  The local EMD survey found in Appendix A was sent to the 
174 email addresses provided on that list, and the survey was sent in a manner 
that did not allow forwarding or multiple completions of the survey by a single 
individual.  18 of the surveys returned as undeliverable.216  3 of 22 surveys (14%) 
were excluded because the respondent did not check “Local Emergency 
Management Director (Local EOC Director)” under Question 6, “During an 
incident, how do you see your role (check all that apply).”  The survey was sent 




My name is Ludwig J. Schumacher and I am a Master’s student in class 
0701 at the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense 
and Security (www.chds.us).  I am writing a thesis addressing 
regionalization and span of control of emergency management functions. 
  
As part of my research, I am sending out a one-time survey to local / 
municipal Emergency Management Directors.  Please click on the link 
below to complete the short survey.  Your time in answering the short 
questions below is greatly appreciated!  If you are not the Emergency 
Management Director, please forward the email of the current director to 
me at ljschuma@nps.edu.  Again, I sincerely thank you in advance for 
your participation! 
                                            
214 Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency, www.mass.gov/mema/ (accessed 
August 18, 2008). 
215 Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency, “Emergency Management Directors 
Listing,” www.mass.gov/mema/ (accessed August 18, 2008). 
216 Notice from the survey provider: “One or more of your recipient addresses are invalid. 
This can happen when an address does not exist, has been closed, or has been individually 
blocked from receiving mail by the recipient ISP.” 
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4. Please identify the total number of events that you have had experience performing 
emergency management functions. 
# Response   
1 
Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
15 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
1 




3 Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 5 
4 
Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
2 




5 Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) one 
6 
Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
0 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
20+ 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
10 




9 Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 3 
10 
Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
10-12 






Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
20 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
10 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
25+ 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
a dozen or more since 1978 
State Declarations (total number of events, even if federal declaration) 
same 
Federal Declarations 
probably one half as many 
15 
Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
1 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
2 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
4 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
2 









5. What additional training would you like to have to make you more prepared to serve as a 
local/municipal EMD? 
# Response   
1 Filling out some of the gov't paperwork-  
2 resource management 
3 More training for new EMDs on paperwork and required filings 
4 Grant writing and financial management of events. Operational "best preactices" 
5 None, I've been an active fulltime EMD for 25 years.  
6 
In my case none. I am about to retire but, for someone just entering the field they need a broad based 
education in business management, administration, finance, and development of organizational skills as 
well as, Debris management and inventory techniques. In addition to the formal education they must have 
"time on the ground" say, several years and of actual hands on experience in working the various aspects 
of Emergency management. The idea that effective leadership can be gained from classroom learning is 
incorrect. The model that needs to be in place for effective Emergerncy leaders is the military model. Even 
the Generals in the military begin as lowly Lt.s and as they gain field experience they advance in rank. 
People in general and especially those in a disaster respond much better and quicker to someone "who 
has been there and done it." Make no mistake about it, people in these situations immediately "see right 
through" the phonies who have no experience and are operating form the "do as I say" mode instead of 
from experience. Experience provides the opportunity to learn to anticipate and prepare several levles of 
contingency plans and responses. The polictically appointed Emergency manager does not have that 
experiencial learning to draw upon and therefore has to learn from his/her own mistakes at the expense of 
the victims of the incident he/she is supose to be assisting.  
7 I'd rather see more equipment or grants instead of training. The State provides many training courses. 
8 More in depth training on the details of NIMS and how it functions at the national level, this would be in addition to ICS etc. 










7. Does your municipality have a pre-identified facility for your local Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC)? 
# Response   
1 But the facility is lacking in many technology needs, and could not accommodate a large EOC set-up (more than a medium sized, local event.) 
2 Full communications capability with FD, PD, EMS, EM within a 20 mile radius as well as state agencies. 
3 It is within the Police Dept, but not very efficient. 







8. If you have a pre-identified location for your local EOC, are there any improvements to that 
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facility which are specific to its EOC functions? (For example, phones, radios, computers, etc.) 
# Response   
1 Maps, wireless internet 
2 Emergency Power, High speed internet, multiple phone lines, briefing room, multiple radio systems 
3 Additional phone lines and permanently mounted radio banks, computers, improved bathroom facilities, more parking (new location) 
4 Telephones, internet connections, computers, maps, storage area 
5 Radios, phones, new building to meet today's codes. 
6 
Laptops with Internet & city connectability for 10, 3 large screen TV's, 2 way radio's on Low band, UHF, 
VHF, 800 mhz, Aircraft, 2 Meter and Marine. Link to homeland security and city security camera's [total 
65] 
7 An office with phones, radios and computers. 
8 
The Police Dept was retrofitted with phones and antennae for communcations, however many of those 
items have stoppped working or are outdated. It would take much more money then the Town provides 
my budget with, to fix the problems. 





10. Any additional comments you may have concerning any of the above questions: 
# Response   
1 we need to streamline the amount of agencies that we report to to do our jobs 
2 Our Emergency Management Department is a vital component of our public safety. 9-1-1 in The City of Chelsea MA [the 11 busiest PSAP per capata in MA] is in Emergency Management and not PD or FD. 
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APPENDIX D.  NEW HAMPSHIRE LOCAL EMD SURVEY 
PROCESS AND RESULTS 
New Hampshire has 234 municipalities with the responsibility for having 
Emergency Management Directors.  I could not locate an email list of municipal 
Emergency Management Directors for New Hampshire, but I was able to locate a 
list of municipalities in New Hampshire, that included links to many of the 
municipalities’ websites.217  Not all New Hampshire municipalities have websites.  
I reviewed the available webpages for municipalities in New Hampshire and 
attempted to select a single email address for each municipality using the 
following process:  If the website listed an EMD, then that email address was 
used.  If the website did not list an EMD, or the EMD did not have an email 
address listed, then the Fire Chief’s email address was selected.  If those were 
not available, then the Police Chief’s email address was selected.  If none of the 
above were available, then the Selectman’s address was used.  Finally, in the 
absence of all of the above, if the website listed an email address for the Town 
Clerk or for town general information then email address was used.  Very few 
New Hampshire municipalities listed an Emergency Management Department or 
Director as a municipal department, although some did.218  Some websites listed 
a Fire Chief,219 Police Chief, or a member of the Police Department220 
specifically as EMD.  Several municipal websites that the Emergency 
Management department was established under the New Hampshire Emergency  
 
 
                                            
217 New Hampshire Local Government Center, 
http://www.nhlgc.org/LGCWebSite/InfoForOfficials/nhmunicipalities.htm (accessed August 16, 
2008). 
218 Perhaps the most detailed information available was The Town of Stoddard’s website 
shows an EOP with ESFs. 
219 See e.g., Dover, NH. 
220 See e.g., Durham, NH. 
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Management Act,221 but the act appears to have been repealed.222  In every 
case, I sent a maximum of one email to a municipality, asking that if they were 
not the EMD, to forward the survey as appropriate.   
The process used was therefore different from the Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, and Vermont EMD surveys.  The Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
and Vermont surveys were sent to an email list of identified EMDs, and the 
selected electronic survey options for those surveys did not permit those EMDs 
to forward the survey.  In other words, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Vermont 
EMD surveys could only be complete once, by the specified individual.  The New 
Hampshire surveys could be forwarded to anyone for completion, and could 
potentially have been completed multiple times by the same or other individuals. 
The end result was that out of the 234 municipalities in New Hampshire, 
the survey was sent to a single individual in 140 separate municipalities.  Five of 
the surveys returned as undeliverable.223  3 of 10 surveys (30%) were excluded 
because the respondent did not check “Local Emergency Management Director 
(Local EOC Director)” under Question 6, “During an incident, how do you see 
your role (check all that apply).”  The survey was sent with the following text: 
If you are the Emergency Management Director for your municipality, 
please complete the survey below.  If you are not the Emergency 
Management Director for your municipality, please forward to your 
local Emergency Management Director. 
 
Hello, my name is Ludwig Schumacher and I am a graduate student at the 
Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security.  I 
am currently conducting research in support of my masters thesis.  An 
important aspect of my research is understanding the span of control for 
emergency management functions between the local and state 
emergency operation centers in the New England states. 
                                            
221 Town of Columbia, New Hampshire, Columbia Management and Community, 
http://www.columbianh.org/management.htm (accessed August 11, 2008). 
222 New Hampshire General Court, http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/viii/107-c/107-c-
mrg.htm (accessed August 16, 2008). 
223 Notice from the survey provider: “One or more of your recipient addresses are invalid. 
This can happen when an address does not exist, has been closed, or has been individually 
blocked from receiving mail by the recipient ISP.” 
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If you are a municipal Emergency Management Director, please take the 
time today to complete the survey. Your input is very important to my 
research.  The survey can be accessed by clicking on the link below.  
The survey consists of 10 questions and can be completed in less than 5 
minutes.  About the survey: 
• This survey is completely voluntary; there is no penalty for not 
completing it.  
• This survey does not identify you through any personal 
identification and only collects data about you as it pertains to 
demographic information.  
• Your answers will be kept strictly confidential and will not be 
released in any form that can be identified with you individually.  
• Results of the survey may be published in aggregate form only, 
without identifying any individual or organization.  
Thank you,  
Ludwig J. Schumacher  
Graduate Student  
ljschuma@nps.edu  
Naval Postgraduate School  












4. Please identify the total number of events that you have had experience performing 
emergency management functions. 
# Response   
1 Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 2 
2 
Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
10 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
3 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
2 




5 Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) hundreds 
6 
Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
10 
Federal Declarations 







5. What additional training would you like to have to make you more prepared to serve as a 
local/municipal EMD? 
# Response   
1 Specific training on the Local Emergency Mangement interface with Regional and State Emergency Managment Plans. 
2 ICS 300 and 400 












8. If you have a pre-identified location for your local EOC, are there any improvements to that 
facility which are specific to its EOC functions? (For example, phones, radios, computers, etc.) 
# Response   
1 Cell Phone amplifier, desk chairs 







10. Any additional comments you may have concerning any of the above questions: 
# Response   
1 It is very diffucult to convince local officials of the importance of prepariing for an event which requries the opening of an EOC. 
2 we try to run the EOC from the police station and operations from the neighboring fire stations to seperate functions and working conditions.  






APPENDIX E.  VERMONT LOCAL EMD SURVEY PROCESS AND 
RESULTS 
Vermont has 251 municipalities with the responsibility for having 
emergency management directors.  Vermont Emergency Management maintains 
an email distribution list entitled Emergency Management Directors.  The local 
EMD survey found in Appendix A was sent to the 459 email addresses provided 
on that list, and the survey was sent in a manner that did not allow forwarding or 
multiple completions of the survey by a single individual.  114 of the surveys 
returned as undeliverable, due in large part to email blocking mechanisms of two 
regional internet service providers.224  4 of 22 surveys (18%) were excluded 
because the respondent did not check “Local Emergency Management Director 
(Local EOC Director)” under Question 6, “During an incident, how do you see 
your role (check all that apply).”  The survey was sent with the following text: 
 
If you are the Emergency Management Director for your municipality, 
please complete the survey below! 
 
Hello, my name is Ludwig Schumacher and I am enrolled in a distance 
learning course at the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security (http://chds.us/).  I am currently conducting research 
in support of my thesis.  An important aspect of my research is 
understanding the span of control for emergency management functions 
between the local and state emergency operation centers in the New 
England states, particularly in the five states without county EOCs. 
If you are a municipal Emergency Management Director, please take the 
time today to complete the survey. Your input is very important to my 
research.  The survey can be accessed by clicking on the link below.  
The survey consists of 10 questions and can be completed in less than 5 
minutes.  About the survey: 
 
                                            
224 Notice from the survey provider: “One or more of your recipient addresses are invalid. 
This can happen when an address does not exist, has been closed, or has been individually 
blocked from receiving mail by the recipient ISP.” 
 110
• This survey is completely voluntary; there is no penalty for not 
completing it.  
• This survey does not identify you through any personal 
identification and only collects data about you as it pertains to 
demographic information.  
• Your answers will be kept strictly confidential and will not be 
released in any form that can be identified with you individually.  
• Results of the survey may be published in aggregate form only, 
without identifying any individual or organization.  
Thank you,  
Ludwig J. Schumacher 
ljschuma@nps.edu 
Naval Postgraduate School 












4. Please identify the total number of events that you have had experience performing 
emergency management functions. 
# Response   
1 
Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
3 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
0 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
5 




4 Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 2 
5 
Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
5 
State Declarations (total number of events, even if federal declaration) 
2 
6 
Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
5 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
None 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
0 






Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
1 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
3 very serious plus countless others in CT & VT 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
5 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
a few at local level, I'm also member of Fire Dept 





Local Emergencies (total number of events, even if state or federal declaration) 
1000+ (not specific to local EMD role) 
State Declarations (total number of events, even if federal declaration) 
10+ (not specific to local EMD role) 
Federal Declarations 





5. What additional training would you like to have to make you more prepared to serve as a 
local/municipal EMD? 
# Response   
1 Basics of being an EMD, local and state authority/statutes for the EMD.  
2 More ICS training! 
3 Interaction with State EM 
4 more locally training 
5 frequent drills are helpful 
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6 None. Training supplied by Vermont Emergency Management is sufficient. 
7 more table top exercises with local first responders. The ones we have had were super but we need more and regular every couple of months. 
8 I would like to see more training that is practical and realistic that can be built on rather thanstarting for thr so called "big one" 
9 none 








7. Does your municipality have a pre-identified facility for your local Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC)? 
# Response   
1 
We do have an identified location for our EOC, and do have funding to make it functional (question 
below), however we feel this location is not suitable for a larger scale event and are looking at other 
locations at this time.  
2 We serve as a Reception Center in the event of a nuclear accident 





8. If you have a pre-identified location for your local EOC, are there any improvements to that 
facility which are specific to its EOC functions? (For example, phones, radios, computers, etc.) 
# Response   
1 We have funding available to install phones, computers/networking and radios. However we will likely not utilize this location and are looking at alternatives 
2 Communications equip. (phones,internet access) 
3 Extra phone , radio and computer connections available. Bulletin, chalk and white erase boards on every wall. 
4 Vermont Emergency Management has equipped our command center with communication and office needs 
5 a generator would be good but no money 










10. Any additional comments you may have concerning any of the above questions: 
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# Response   
1 I would like to see more frequent offering of courses from VEM, both the ICS series, and other courses they offer.  
2 The function of EM should not cntinue to be an indvidual community effort. There needs to be a regional approach. Insufficient resources supporting too many un-coordinated efforts. 
3 None. 
4 Why does the survey recycle back to the beginning every time I click on a choice answer to a question? 
5 
I have managed several real major hurricane emergencies in another state and I am unhappy with the 
lack of participation of the non paid organizations which are the back bone of first response in the rural 
world. Also much of the required training places unrealistic demands on volunteer organizations such as 
fire and EMS. Since 9/11 everyone has become complacent again except for those that have now 
managed to make a career out of Homeland Security 
6 No 
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